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I. INTRODUCTION
Many federal judges do not have time for their civil dockets. The
amount of time the average district judge devotes to civil trials has
declined steadily in the last ten years.' Simultaneously, the criminal
dockets have grown too large and become too complex for the district
1. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Remarks to the Litigation Section of the
American Bar Association 8 (Oct. 21, 1993)(on fie with the author)("Recent studies show that the number of civil trials conducted on the average by each judge,
and the number of days each judge spends in civil trials, are both at all time lows.
Today, although criminal cases make up only fifteen percent of the docket of the
federal courts, forty-seven percent of the trials conducted in federal court are
criminal trials."). See Patrick E. Longan, The Shot Clock Comes to Trial: Time
Limits for Federal Civil Trials, 35 ARiz. L. Ray. 663, 671 (1993). Although not
every district is experiencing this shortage of civil trial time, it is significant
where it occurs. In 1991, for example, the active judges of the Middle District of
Florida suspended civil trials "in an effort to keep pace with the courts criminal
felony caseload." Middle District of FloridaSuspends Civil Trials,TInD BRANcH
(Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.) Feb. 1991, at 9.
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judges to spend sufficient time tending to civil cases 2 which by law
have lower priority. 3 Congress continues to create more federal
crimes 4 despite urgent entreaties not to do so. 5 The President and
Senate have moved slowly to fill district court vacancies, 6 and many
believe that adding more judges is an unacceptable solution.7
The ever-increasing pressures on the district judges have resulted
in two trends in the handling of civil cases. The first is the increasing
2. According to the Administrative Office of the United States Courts, the number of
new criminal cases increased from 27,968 in 1980 to 47,467 in 1992. Longan,
supra note 1, at 673 (summarizing statistics appearing in the Annual Report of
the Director of the Office of the United States Courts for the years 1980-92). The
"weighted" criminal filing per judgeship, which is a measure of the number and
complexity of the criminal case, increased from 47 to 54 in the same time period.
Id. at 674. See also 1980 ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN. OFF. OF THE
U.S. CTs. 290 [hereinafter 1980 ANNUAL REPoRT](discussing the weighting
system).

3. The Speedy Trial Act imposes deadlines on the indictment and trial of federal
criminal defendants, but there is no comparable statute for civil cases. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161 (1988).
4. For example, Congress has made "car-jacking" a federal crime. Anti-Car Theft
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-519, 106 Stat. 3384 (1992)(codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2119 (Supp. V 1993)). See Crime Bill Elicits Strong Reactions From Diverse Groups, THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.) Mar.
1994, at 4. The Chair of the Section of Litigation of the American Bar Association
recently noted that the number of federal crimes, which originally was three, now
is over 3,000, while the number of local assistant U.S. Attorneys has increased by
a factor of 2.5 in 14 years. Robert N. Sayler, Tigers At The Gates-The Justice
System Approaches Melt-Down, LrIG., Fall 1993, at 1, 1. For a general discussion of the "federalization" of both civil and criminal matters, see William W.
Schwarzer & Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalizationof the Administrationof
Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 STETSON L. REv. 651 (1994).
5. The Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was recently quoted as saying: "Rapid, unchecked federalization of criminal activity could overwhelm the
limited resources of federal law enforcement agencies, including the FBI." Dan
Freedman, FBI Criticizes Trend Toward "Federalizing";Agents Don't Want to Be
Street Cops, Hous. CHRON., Dec. 19, 1993, at A2. The same report quoted Chief
Justice William Rehnquist: "To shift large numbers of cases presently being decided in the state courts to the federal courts for reasons which are largely symbolic would be a disservice." Id. Senator Ernest Hollings recently observed that
one could get the Senate to vote in favor of virtually any expansion of criminal
jurisdiction and stated "[i]t's gotten silly around this town." CongressFocuses on
Cost of Crime, THIRD BRANCH, (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.) Mar.
1994, at 5.
6. In October 1994, there were 93 vacancies in the federal courts and only 27 nominations pending. Total Vacancies, FED. CT. APPOINTMENTS REP. Sept.-Oct. 1994,
at 50. See also Chief Justice Urges Fast Appointments of Federal Judges, N.Y.
TmEs, Jan. 2, 1994, § 1, at 17.
7. For a summary of the arguments for and against expanding the size of the Article
III judiciary, see FEDERAL JUD. CENTER, IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER

OF FEDERAL JUDGES (1993). See also Stephen Reinhardt, Too Few Judges, Too
Many Cases, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1993, at 52; Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practiceof Precedent in the Large Appellate Court,
56 U. CHI. L. REv. 541 (1989).

1994]

MAGISTRATES AS MEDIATORS

use of judicial "adjuncts" such as magistrates, bankruptcy judges, law
clerks, staff attorneys, interns, externs, and the other ingredients of
"bureaucratic justice."8 The second development, more aptly called a
movement, 9 has been to direct civil cases away from adjudication to
alternative forms of dispute resolution such as arbitration, mediation,
early neutral evaluation, and summary jury trials.1O Each of these
developments attempts to cope with the logjam in the district judge's
courtroom. Each has its supporters and its critics."1
The two developments converge when judicial adjuncts, particularly magistrates, mediate civil cases. 12 Using magistrates to assist in
8. The use of judicial adjuncts has been the subject of extensive judicial and academic comment. See, e.g., RicHARD A. POSNER, THE

FEDERAL

COURTS 102-19

(1985); Owen Fiss, The Bureaucratizationof the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442
(1983); Wade H. McCree, Jr., BureaucraticJustice: An Early Warning, 129 U.
PA. L. REv. 777 (1981); Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The

9.

10.

11.

12.

ProliferationofAd Hoc Procedure,137 U. PA. L. Rzv. 2131 (1989). As recently as
June 1994, the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit has noted that one effect of the increasing caseload has been increased
reliance on law clerks and staff attorneys. J. Clifford Wallace, Tackling the
Caseload Crisis,A.B.A. J., June 1994, at 88.
One survey, now six years old, found 130 alternative dispute resolution statutes
passed by state legislatures, with most of those passed from 1980 to 1988.
Sharon Press, Alternative DisputeResolution (ADR): A CriticalReview of the Recent Literature, 14 JUST. Sys. J. 257, 257-58 (1991)(citing ABA, STANDING COMMITEE ON Disp. RESOL., STATE LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1988)). See
also Owen Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984)(describing the ADR Movement); Irving R. Kaufman, Reform for a System in Crisis: Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Federal Courts, 59 FoRDHAM L. Rnv. 1, 9
(1990)(alternative dispute resolution has all the "trappings" of a movement including specialized publications and its own "think tank"); Jethro K. Lieberman
& James F. Henry, Lessons From the Alternative Dispute Resolution Movement,
53 U. CHI. L. REv. 424 (1986)(analyzing the ADR Movement); Maurice Rosenberg, Can Court-RelatedAlternatives Improve Our Dispute Resolution System?,
69 JuDicATuRm 254 (1986)(describing ADR as "a brand new religion").
Among the articles written by sitting federal judges on these topics are Kaufman,
supra note 9; Thomas C. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods ofDisputeResolution, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984); Richard A. Posner, The
Summary Jury Trialand OtherMethods ofAlternative DisputeResolution: Some
Cautionary Observations, 53 U. Cm. L. REv. 366 (1986).
Compare, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 9 (advocating increased use of ADR), with
Judith Resnik, FailingFaith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. Cm. L.
Ray. 494, 535-39 (1986)(expressing concern about ADR becoming a substitute for
trial). See also Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of
Adjudicative Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99
HARv. L. REV. 1808, 1811 (1986). ("[Jludges, lawyers, and legal scholars have
embraced a host of nonadjudicative shortcuts. They have invented innumerable
rationalizations for not doing the job and innumerable ways to avoid it.").
The literature on alternative dispute resolution makes a distinction between judicial mediation and settlement conferences hosted by a judicial officer. See, e.g.,
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Judges and Settlement, TRIAL, Oct. 1985, at 24 (stating
that when more than facilitating communication occurs, it is not mediation). The
distinction is unimportant for purposes of this Article because both a "mediation"
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settlement is not a new idea.13 Magistrates preside over tens of
thousands of pretrial conferences each year, and one of the topics appropriate for such conferences is settlement.14 Some magistrates
have become settlement "specialists" with little other responsibility.15
Other magistrates report having presided over hundreds of settlement
conferences.16 One study of magistrates concluded fourteen years ago
that settlement is where magistrates can have the most impact on expediting civil cases. 17 Another study, however, indicated that district
judges hesitate to turn such matters over to magistrates because the
magistrates do not command sufficient respect from the bar to make
the exercise useful and because the magistrates have been fully occupied with other matters.1 8
There are strong indications, however, that magistrates are being
called upon to take a greater role in the settlement of civil cases. In
1990, Congress passed the Civil Justice Reform Act and charged each
district court with the responsibility for devising plans to reduce cost
and a "settlement conference" are occasions for magistrates to facilitate settlement. The terms, therefore, will be used interchangeably.
13. See CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS, 130 (1990)(describing magistrates' role in settlement). See also HUBERT
L. WILL ET AL., THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN THE SETLEMENT PROCESS 10, 27

(1983)(describing usefulness of using magistrates to settle non-jury cases); Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Forand Against Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory
Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv. 485,492-93 (1985)("[T]he magistrates in
the federal system provide another class of judicial personnel to conduct settlement conferences. In some cases, their presence moots the debate about judicial
role by creating a set of 'settlers or managers' distinct from the set of 'adjudicators and decision-makers.' "). One recent notorious case, Heileman Brewing Co.,
Inc. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 650 (7th Cir. 1989)(en banc) dealt with the
question whether parties could be ordered to attend settlement conferences, and
it began with an order from a magistrate.
14. See 1992 ANN. REP. OF THE DIECTOR OF THE ADmI. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. 83, tbl.
16 [hereinafter 1992 ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting that magistrates conducted
48,420 pretrial conferences in 1992). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7)(listing as
topics for pretrial conference "the possibility of settlement").
15. Magistrate Pat Irwin of the Western District of Oklahoma is a prime example.
He attempts to hold a settlement conference in every civil case. D. MARIE
PROVINE, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DIsTRIcT JUDGES 84-85 (1986).

See also Patrick F. Kelly, Mediation: A Settlement Conference Format That
Works, in ADR AND THE COURTS 133, 134 (Erika S. Fine ed., 1987)(describing use
of part-time magistrate as settlement judge).
16. WAYNE D. BRAZIL, EFFEcTrvE APPROACHES TO SETTLEMENT: A HANDBOOK FOR
LAWYERS AND JUDGES 485 (1988); Michael R. Hogan, JudicialSettlement Confer-

ences: Empowering the Partiesto Decide Through Negotiation, 27 WILL mm-m L.
REv. 429, 430 n.3 (1991).
17. Steven Puro et al., The Evolving Role of U.S. Magistratesin the District Courts,
64 JUDICATURE 437, 447 (1981).
18. PRovmm, supra note 15, at 84.
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and delay in the civil dockets.19 Thirty-four districts implemented
plans by the end of 1991. Four of these incorporate magistrate media-

tion into their plans 2Owhile another eight provide for settlement con-

ferences to be presided over by magistrates. 2 ' Among the
recommendations in other districts are at least three that involve
magistrate settlement conferences.2 2 Also, a committee of the Judicial Conference approved a long-range plan in 1993 that forecast ex23
panded use of magistrates for alternative dispute resolution.
The trend toward using magistrates as mediators is no accident.
To understand why, one must first understand what prevents parties
from settling without assistance. Part II of this Article examines this
question and concludes that parties increasingly need more information than the attorneys can provide. In addition, the parties also need
a more satisfying and structured forum than lawyer-to-lawyer negotiation. One must then compare different forms of mediation to see how
19. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. V 1993). The statute states that each district plan
"shall consider and may include ... authorization to refer appropriate cases to
alternative dispute resolution programs that (A) have been designated for use in
a district court; or (B) the court may make available, including mediation, minitrial, and summary jury trial." Id. § 473(a). The statute also requires the district
to consider, and permits them to include, "a neutral evaluation program for the
presentation of the legal and factual basis of a case to a neutral court representative selected by the court at a nonbinding conference conducted early in the litigation." Id. § 473(b). For discussion of the background of the Civil Justice Reform
Act, see Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in ProceduralJustice, 77
MNiN. L. REV. 375 (1992).
20. Donna Stienstra, ADR In The CJRA Early Implementation Districts, in NEw DiRECTIONS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 491, 493-94 (Sol Schreiber
ed., 1993). The districts are the Southern District of Illinois, the Northern District of Indiana, the District of Kansas, and the Western District of Wisconsin. Id.
at 494.
21. LITIGATION SECTION, A.B.A., REPORT OF TiE TASK FORCE ON THE CIVIL JUSTICE

REFORM ACT 34-35 (1992). The districts are the Eastern District of Wisconsin,
the Eastern District of California, the Eastern District of New York, the District
of Montana, the District of Idaho, the Northern District of California, the Western District of Oklahoma, and the District of Wyoming. Id.
22. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORA ACT ADvisoRy GROUP, U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST.
OF ILL., FINAL REPORT 93 [hereinafter FINAL REPORT]; UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT, W.D.N.Y., Expense and Delay Reduction Plan, 1993 WL 468321 at *4
(May 13, 1993); UNITED STATES DIsTICr COURT, D. MiNN., Implementation Plan,
1993 WL 468299 at *16 (Aug. 23, 1993).
23. MagistrateJudges System Marks Twenty-fifth Anniversary, THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.) Oct. 1993, at 7. It is also interesting to
note that the Judicial Conference's representative at a recent House subcommittee hearing on alternative dispute resolution was a magistrate judge. House
Studies Alternative DisputeResolution in FederalCourts,THmD BRANCH (Admin.
Off. of the U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.) June 1992, at 5. Each of these events confirms
one commentator's recent observation that the trend toward having magistrates
conduct settlement discussions is "a trend that is likely to continue." Janet
Cooper Alexander, Judge's Self-Interest and Procedural Rules: Comment on
Macy, 23 J. LEGAL STUDES 647, 652 (1994).
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each meets those needs. Part III makes those comparisons with respect to mediation by private lawyers, trial judges, and magistrates.
It concludes that magistrates are being used to mediate cases more
because they are in a unique position to do so effectively. Other forces
are also driving magistrates into more mediation. Part IV discusses
why district judges need to spend the limited time they have for civil
cases in other ways. It also examines changes in the workload of magistrates that may make it possible for the magistrates to realize their
potential as mediators.
The magistrate system was designed to be flexible so that it can
adapt to changing needs and possibilities.24 The nature of federal
civil litigation has changed and continues to change in ways that permit and, indeed, require magistrates to assume a greater role in settling cases. This Article explains why magistrates can and should
mediate more civil cases.
II. OBSTACLES TO UNASSISTED SETTLEMENT
Alternative dispute resolution techniques exist because parties
and lawyers need help in settling cases. The first problem with which
they need help is the problem of divergent expectations about the outcome of trial. The second type of problem concerns the nature of the
forum for settlement. This section discusses each of these needs as a
prelude to comparing how well different forms of mediation meet
them.
A.

Informational Needs
1. The Need for Convergent Expectations

The economic model of settlement assumes that each party will
come to a bottom-line figure by predicting the outcome and extra expense of continued litigation and comparing that expected value with
settlement. 2 5 The plaintiff's expected outcome of trial, Ep, is the
probability of victory multiplied by the plaintiff's estimate of the
amount of the judgment if there is one. The plaintiff's expected net
return from continued litigation is this figure minus the cost, Cp, that
the plaintiff will incur to obtain it. The plaintiff will settle if the settlement offer is at least equal to the expected return from trial, Ep - Cp.
24. SMITH, supra note 13, at 3.
25. This process has been described in more detail elsewhere. Longan, supra note 1,
at 683-95. The origins of the model of settlement are in the work of John Gould,
Richard Posner, and William Landes. See John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal
Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL SUD. 279 (1973); William M. Landes, An EconomicAnalysis
of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1972); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399
(1973).
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Any lower offer would be unacceptable because the plaintiff expects to
do better at trial.
Similarly, the defendant compares settlement to the expected outcome of the trial. The expected loss of the defendant, Ed, is the
probability assigned by the defendant to a plaintiff victory multiplied
by the defendant's estimate of the judgment if there is one. The defendant must also consider the cost of continuing to litigate, Cd, and
compare any settlement demand with the expected total loss if the
defendant does not settle, Ed + Cd. Only if the settlement demand is
less than or equal to this figure will the defendant settle.
The condition for settlement is that the plaintiff's minimum demand, Ep - Cp, must be less than or equal to the defendant's maximum
settlement offer, Ed + Cd. An equivalent formulation is that settlement will occur if Ep - Ed < Cp + Cd. The settlement decision thus depends upon the parties' expectations and the costs of litigation.26

Cases will be difficult to settle if the parties have divergent expectations about the outcome of trial. If the plaintiff assigns a significantly greater probability to victory or a significantly higher damage
award if there is a judgment than the defendant does, then the plaintiff's expectation, ED, will be much different than the defendant's expectations, Ed. The higher Ep - Ed is, the less likely settlement is to
occur. The algebraic result confirms common sense. The plaintiff with
high hopes is hard to pacify. The defendant with no fear is less likely
to pay a large settlement. Divergent expectations make settlement
unlikely.
On the other hand, settlement should occur if the parties have convergent expectations. 2 7 The closer their expectations are, the more
likely the parties are to reach agreement and to split the savings of
not litigating to a foregone conclusion.28 If Ep - Ed approaches zero,
the condition for settlement is more likely to be satisfied. It is easy to
see why. If the parties know what the outcome of trial will be, they
can settle and save the cost of going forward with the litigation. Convergent expectations are the primary reason that ninety percent of all
26. For a description and criticism of the process by which lawyers usually undertake
to reach what she calls the "zone of agreement," see Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem-Solving, 31
UCLA L. Ray. 754, 764-94 (1984). For a description of how these types of calculations drive the settlement process in an actual case, see Lucy V. Katz, The
L'Ambiance PlazaMediation: A Case Study in JudicialSettlement ofMass Torts,
5 0mo ST. J. ON DIsp. REsOL. 277, 326-27 (1990).
27. Cf Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargainingin the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
28. Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contractin Consent Judgments, 1987 U. Cm.
LEGAL F. 19, 25.
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disputes never reach litigation. 2 9 Litigation is simply self-defeating
when the outcome is certain.
2.

Why PartiesNeed Assistance

In a perfect world, the lawyers should be able to gather and process
the information about the case and, using their experience and expertise, agree on the likely outcome of all but the most novel of cases.3 0
In particular, lawyers should be able to draw on their own experiences
and the results of trials of similar cases to predict accurately the value
of a case.3 1 There are at least two reasons, other than the novelty of a
case, why lawyers may not be able to agree on the likely outcome of a
case. Both problems are of recent origin. Both are getting worse.
First, today's civil litigators-as opposed to trial lawyers-are incapable of predicting trial outcomes reliably because so few have significant trial experience.3 2 One judge noted that experienced lawyers
can settle cases "before the coffee gets cold."33 However, the size of the
litigation bar in the United States has increased dramatically in the
last twenty years. As a result, there is an entire generation of litigators for whom trial remains theoretical. Lawyers with little or no
trial experience are in no position to assess the effect of evidence, witnesses, or theories. They need help to predict accurately what will

29. David M. Trubek, et al., The Costs of OrdinaryLitigation, 31 UCLA L. REv. 72,

86-87 (1983).
30. Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposalsfor Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1302 (1978); Stephen McG. Bundy
& Einer Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General
Theory of Litigation Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REv. 313, 365-66
(1991).
31. Stephen Daniels, Tracing the Shadow of the Law: Jury Verdicts in Medical Malpractice Cases, 14 JUST. Sys. J. 4 (1990).
32. See Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior ofthe Tort
Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1223 (1992)("The
average active litigator tries only a handful of cases each year... A trial lawyer's
situation [in attempting to value a case] is similar to that of a blindfolded archer
who is permitted to see the target only 5 percent of the time, and then only
through a fog at dusk."). See also Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the FrontLines:
Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 Am.
B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 239 (1980); John F. Grady, Trial Lawyers, Litigators, and
Client Costs, 4 LrrG. (A.BA. Sec. on Litig.), Spring 1978, 5, 6; Longan, supranote
1, at 689-91; Resnik, supra note 11, at 522.
33. KENNErH E. CONN, SETTErMENT CONFERENCES: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES AND

LAwYERS 31 (1988).
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happen at trial.3 4 As a result, the unassisted settlement process can
break down.3 5
The lawyers' inexperience is exacerbated by the second problem.
There is, at least in federal court, a shortage of civil trial time. The
number of civil trials in federal court is declining while the size of the
litigation bar is increasing.3 6 Because there are fewer federal trials to
be shared among more litigators, obtaining the litigation experience
necessary to predict results is becoming more difficult. The diminishing stock of trial results also impedes the efforts of those litigators to
base their expectations on results obtained by others. There are simply fewer cases to which the lawyer can compare his or her case. 37
Without the information and the experience to process that information, litigators are less able to come to reliable, convergent expectations about a case. Accordingly, unassisted settlement is less likely.
B.

Procedural Needs

The economic model of settlement tells us when settlement is rational, but it is not always enough for a settlement to be rational. Settlement involves people, litigants and lawyers, and the indisputable
theorems of algebra and probability do not satisfy the human needs
that can impede settlement. Process, as well as substance, matters. 38
What those human needs are, and how mediation can assist in satisfying them, is the subject of this section.

34.

35.
36.

37.
38.

WAYNE D. BRAzIL, SETrLNG CiviL Surrs 97-98 (1985). See also FREDERICK B.
LACEY, THE JUDGE'S ROLE IN THE SETTLEMNT OF CIvTL Surrs 14-15 (1977)("[T]he

difficult cases to settle are those in which there is a disparity in counsel's skill,
experience, and knowledge of the case.").
See generally, Longan, supra note 1, at 691 (describing causes and consequences
of the "disappearance of the trial lawyer").
See supranote 1. See also Mitchell F. Dolin & Robert N. Sayler, Twenty Years of
Litigation,LrTG. (A.B.A. Sec. on Litig.), Fall 1993, at 6, 6 (stating the size of ABA
Litigation section has grown from 38,000 to 65,000 in 10 years while the size of
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America has grown significantly to 57,000).
See Longan, supra note 1, at 689-91.
See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A
Tale of Innovation Co-Opted or "The Law of ADR", 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1, 6
(1991)("In what has become a commonly recognized division in the literature and
advocacy about ADR, we see two basically different justifications for processes
that resolve cases short of trial-what I call quantitative-efficiency claims versus
qualitative-justice claims."). See also Paul Marcotte, Can't Get No Satisfaction?,
A.B.A J., July 1988, at 28 ('[Pleople often care less about how much money they

can get than about the process by which they got it.").
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The ProceduralNeeds of the Parties
a. Catharsis

Litigants usually feel wronged or wrongly accused.3 9 Those feelings must be dealt with before the parties will be ready psychologically to accept even the most rational settlement. What the litigant
needs is a catharsis, the chance to express his or her position about
the events that led to the dispute.4 0 Litigants "must be allowed to tell
their stories to a sympathetic listener who is not attempting to ignore
or minimize their tragic circumstances ....

They have at least been

provided with the opportunity to explain." 4 1 When the settlement
such a catharsis possible, settlement often follows
process 4makes
2
quickly.

b. Deflation
Another frequent problem is that clients either do not receive or do
not believe reliable information from their counsel about the likely
outcome of the case. Lawyers do raise false hopes about cases, especially early in litigation, and they may be reluctant to share with their
43
clients their revised, more realistic assessment, later in the case.
Clients, of course, have the final word with respect to settling cases. 44
If the lawyers filter the information about the case and do not assist
the clients with realistic predictions, settlement opportunities will be
missed.
39. See Hogan, supra note 16, at 445 (noting that, in this magistrate's experience,

40.

41.
42.
43.

44.

feelings have a life of their own, and that clients often feel emotionally that their
integrity has been challenged). See also Robert Mnookin, Why NegotiationsFail:
An Exploration of Barriersto the Resolution of Conflict, 8 Omo ST. J. oN Disp.
RESOL. 235, 248-49 (1993).
Robert F. Peckham, et al., Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experiment to Expedite
Dispute Resolution, in ADR AND THE CouRTs, supra note 15, at 165, 175. See also
Donald T. Weckstein, The Purposesof DisputeResolution: ComparativeConcepts
ofJustice, 26 AM. Bus. L.J. 605, 608 (1988)(describing cathartic processes of other
cultures).
CHARLEs B. CRAVER, EFFEcTrvE LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 286 (2d ed.
1993)(discussing the views of Judge Murray Richtel).
See, e.g., Katz, supra note 26, at 291-92 (observing that "some disputes settle as
soon as each side has the chance" to tell their story).
Judge Patrick Kelly's letter to counsel about mediation in the District of Kansas
recognizes this problem when it states, "Hopefully, [the client's] expectations
have not been unduly inflated, i.e. can't lose-can't win!" Kelly, supra note 15, at
147. Judge Richard Posner has observed that part of the judge's role in settlement is to communicate the realities of the case to the client without the "distortion" of the lawyer. Posner, supra note 10, at 392.
See, e.g., RuLEs REGULATING FLA. BAR 4-1.2 (1991)("A lawyer shall abide by a
client's decision whether to make or accept an offer of settlement of a matter.").
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Sometimes the client simply does not believe the lawyer and needs

to have his optimism doused by someone else.4 5 Try as the lawyer

might, the lawyer cannot convince the party that things are as bleak
as they really are, either because the lawyer's earlier advice was different or because the client is simply bull-headed. The settlement process that relies on convergent expectations cannot settle such a case
until the client, who retains the power to settle or not to settle, is convinced of the calculation.
2. The ProceduralNeeds of the Lawyers
Often the lawyers are the ones who need a mediator.4 6 Because
litigation practice has become uncivil and unprofessional, even bitter,
many lawyers on opposite sides of a case cannot bring themselves to
speak to one another, let alone work cooperatively toward a settlement. 47 Reflections of this problem appear in the numerous professionalism codes that courts and bar associations have promulgated in
45. Wayne D. Brazil et al., EarlyNeutral Evaluation: An ExperimentalEffort to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 69 JUDicATURE 279, 283 (1986)("In other cases the

evaluatoer's assessments could help attorneys with unrealistic clients. Occasionally clients have unrealistic expectations about litigation (both its probable outcome and its burdens). And, occasionally, lawyers hired by such clients have
difficulty dislodging those expectations.").
46. This breakdown in the ability of lawyers to communicate, which necessitates the
involvement of a mediator or judicial officer, may be part of a larger trend to
compensate with judicial resources for the lawyer's inability or unwillingness to
do what the profession requires of them. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Judge's
Role in PretrialCase Processing: Assessing the Need for Change, 66 JUDmcATURE
28, 29 (1982)(describing how the need for judicial involvement in discovery and
other pretrial matters reverses the trend of the previous 40 years to turn case
processing over to lawyers outside of the courthouse). For a general discussion of
the problem of incivility, see, e.g., William A. Brewer I & Francis B. Majorie,
One Year After Dondi: Time to Get Back to Litigating?, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 833
(1990); Craig Enoch, Incivility in the Legal System? Maybe It's the Rules, 47 SMU
L. Rav. 199 (1994); Eugene R. Gaetke, Kentucky's New Rules of ProfessionalConduct for Lawyers, 78 Ky. L.J. 767 (1989-90); Warren L. Mengis, ProfessionalResponsibility, 49 LA. L. REv. 487 (1988); Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators:
Pitting Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 637 (1990);
Thomas M. Reavley, Response to 'One Year After Dondi: Time to Get Back to
Litigating?",17 PEPP. L. REv. 851 (1990); Paul Lowell Haines, Note, Restraining
the Overly Zealous Advocate: Time for Judicial Intervention, 65 IND. L.J. 445
(1990).
47. The bitterness in many cases has resulted in obscenity and in a few cases in
fisticuffs. One widely reported deposition exchange involved Joseph Jamail calling his adversary a "fat boy," an "asshole," and "a big fat tub of shit," while the
target of these comments called him "Mr. Hairpiece." BarWars, HARPER'S MAGAznE, Jan. 1993, at 32. It is difficult to imagine these two lawyers working cooperatively toward a settlement of whatever dispute brought them together, but that
type of behavior is all too common. See David A. Kaplan, How's Your Lawyer's
Left Jab?, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 26, 1990, at 70 (reporting on fist fight that erupted in
Dallas during a witness interview).
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an attempt to remedy this problem. Many of the codes deal with the
problem of lawyers who cannot, or refuse to, discuss amicable resolution of their dispute. One example is the civility code of the Seventh
Circuit which imposes a duty on counsel to "endeavor to confer early
with other counsel to assess settlement possibilities" and recognizes
that "[clonduct that may be characterized as uncivil, abrasive, abusive, hostile, or obstructive impedes the fundamental goal of resolving
disputes rationally, peacefully, and efficiently." 48 The Tenets of Professional Courtesy of the Kansas City Metropolitan Bar Association
states that "A Lawyer Should Maintain a Cordial and Respectful Relationship With Opposing Counsel."4 9 The comment to this tenet recognizes that "effective and open communication between lawyers aids
the resolution of the conflict."50 Perhaps the saddest commentary is
that lawyers need official reminders of such obvious facts. In today's
environment, they must be told that the lawyer sometimes owes the
client, and always owes the system of justice, the duty to seek peace.
At the root of the problem is the combination of three facts about
American civil litigation. First, the process is adversarial, meaning
that the development of the case is in the hands of the lawyers. That
power and posture breed the attitude that the adversary's lawyer is
your enemy. Second, virtually all of pretrial practice occurs outside
the direct supervision of any judicial authority. Any lawyer who is
inclined to be combative has some rein. Third, the litigation bar has
grown so dramatically, particularly in urban areas, that the lawyers
have less fear that they will face the same adversary in a series of
cases over their careers. One is more apt to misbehave when one is
unlikely to encounter the victim again.5 1 Each of these facts contribute to the "Rambo" approach to litigation. Rambo does not settle.
48. COMMITTEE ON CIVILITY, SEVENTH FEDERAL JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, FINAL REPORT,

1A,

2A (1992)(on file with the author).
49. KANSAS CITY METO. BAR ASS'N, TENETS OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY 2 (1987)(on

file with the author). See also Mississippi Guidelines of Professional Conduct,
Miss. LAw. Apr.-May 1991, at 10 ("Lawyers should treat each other... with
courtesy and civility and conduct themselves in a professional manner at all
times.").
50. KANSAS CITY METRo. BAR Ass'N, supra note 49. In a similar vein, the Illinois
State Bar Association has recognized that "courtesy can facilitate clients' interests and the expeditious handling of matters at a lower cost to the client." ILLNOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION THE BAR, THE BENCH, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN
ILLINOIS 15 (1987)(on fie with the author). See also PENNSYLvANIA BAR ASSOCIA-

TION

WORKING

RULES

OF

PROFESSIONALISM

(on

file

with

the

au-

thor)("Communications are life lines. Keep the lines open. Telephone calls and
correspondence are a two-way channel; respond to them promptly.... Resolve
differences through negotiation, expeditiously and without needless expense.").
51. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, DisputingThrough Agents: Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers In Litigation, 94 COLUMBIA L. REV. 509, 53839 (1994)(discussing effects of large number of lawyers on the incentive to develop
a good reputation).
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Rambo kicks adversaries and takes names. That attitude impedes
even a rational resolution, and settlement simply cannot occur if the
lawyers will not talk to each other.52
The informational and procedural needs of the parties and lawyers
impede unassisted settlement. Mediation can help, but the question is
what type of mediation can help the most. The next section discusses
three candidates.
III. THREE TYPES OF MEDIATION COMPARED
There are three types of mediation. The first is referral mediation.
Here, the district court refers the case to a non-judicial mediator
either in private practice or, more rarely, as part of a full-time courtannexed mediation service. The second type is mediation by the trial
judge. The third is mediation by the magistrate. How well each can
assist the parties and lawyers in overcoming the obstacles to unassisted settlement is the measure of its value.
A.

Referral Mediation
1. Meeting the InformationalNeeds of Settlement
a. How Referral Mediation Can Work
Non-judicial mediators can contribute to convergent expectations if
their evaluations are credible.53 The mediator assesses the case in
light of his or her experience and frankly shares that assessment.5 4
For this reason, non-judicial mediation programs routinely employ
only very experienced lawyers as mediators. 55 For example, in con52. By causing the court system to use scarce resources to bring them together, when
behaving themselves would obviate the need to use resources in this way, lawyers
are imposing needless costs on the court system. One suggestion has been to
fund these services by special fees. See Stephen B. Goldberg et al.,ADR Problems
and Prospects: Looking to the Future, 69 JuDIcATuRE 291, 297 (1986)("Texas,
meanwhile, has developed a novel path for raising public funds for alternative
dispute resolution; it has authorized counties to add a surcharge to the civil filing
fee, with the accumulated funds to be used to fund alternative programs.").
53. See, e.g., the comments of one lawyer regarding credibility, in BRAzm, supra note
34, at 83. See also Kelly, supra note 15, at 134 ([Tlhe secret to successful mediation is that litigants are heard and advised by one whose judgment they all
respect.").
54. Peckham et al., supranote 40, at 167; Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., American Law Institute, Study on Paths to a Better Way: Litigation,Alternatives, and Accommodation, BackgroundPaper,1989 Duis L.J. 824, 898.
55. See, e.g., John C. Coughenour, Volunteer Attorney Mediation in Washington, in
ADR AND TE CouRTS, supra note 15, at 119, 121 (stating that W.D. Wash. requires substantial litigation practice, a current member of the bar of the W.D.
Wash., and a member of the bar of any federal district court for at least seven
years). See also Middle District of Florida Local Rule 9.02(c); William D. Underwood, DivergenceIn The Age of Cost and Delay Reduction: The Texas Experience
With Federal Civil Justice Reform, 25 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 261, 318 (stating that
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nection with the early neutral evaluation program in the Northern
District of California (a special form of mediation used soon after a
suit is filed), one commentator noted:
For the pilot program, the evaluators were handpicked by the court. They are
all locally well-regarded litigators, with 10-20 years of litigation experience.
The evaluators also almost always possessed great subject matter expertise.
These factors enhanced the quality of the evaluations and their credibility for
the participants. The parties and the lawyers seemed more willing to listen
the evaluation of people with well-established reputations and
and consider
56
expertise.

The wise senior lawyer, as mediator, can help the inexperienced litigator value his or her case by bringing experience to the bargaining table. That experience can guide the lawyers to realistic expectations
about the outcome of the case and can result in settlement where none
was possible before.
b.

How Referral Mediation Can Fail: False Convergence

The risk with referral mediation is not that the mediator will fail to
bring the parties to agree upon the likely outcome of the case but
rather that the mediator may be too good at doing so. A mediator determined to settle a case may manipulate the settlement process to
see that cases settle regardless of the fairness of the result.57 A settlement is unfair to the extent that it is based upon factors other than
the underlying rights and obligations of the parties.55 Referral
mediators are in a position to settle cases without regard to those underlying rights, and they have incentive to do so. Both of these facts
should cause attorneys to hesitate to overcome the barriers to settlement with such a system.
i. How False Convergence Happens
As we have seen, one reason mediation is necessary is to overcome
the inexperience of counsel that makes them unable to form reliable
expectations about the likely outcome of the case. That same inexperience, however, makes the lawyers vulnerable. The litigator is in no
position to judge for himself or herself the reliability of the information that the mediator is providing. The mediator may sense which
W.D. Texas Mediation program requires five years experience and 40 hours of
training).
56. David I. Levine, Early Neutral Evaluation: A Follow-Up Report, 70 JUDiCATURE
236, 239 (1986).
57. Goldberg et al., supra note 52, at 295 (raising the question whether there is "a
danger that in our preoccupation with finding the appropriate dispute resolution
process, we will lose sight of the need for fair outcomes").
58. See Longan, supra note 1, at 684-85. See also Maurice Rosenberg, The Federal
Civil Rules After Halfa Century, 36 ME. L. Rav. 243,245 (1984)(stating that "just
determination" under FED. R. Crv. P. 1 "is one that responds to the merits of the
case and strives to uphold the side that has the support of the facts and the law").
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lawyer is more susceptible to manipulation and take advantage of that
fact in order to achieve a settlement, regardless of the parties' underlying rights and obligations. 59
Evidence of lawyers' susceptibility to manipulation comes from the
Civil Appeals Management Plan (CAMP) of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit. Since 1974, the Second Circuit has
employed staff counsel whose job it is to settle cases or at least narrow
the issues for the court.60 Several lawyers surveyed regarding CAMP
expressed the concern that "inexperienced advocates... 'might take
as 'gospel' staff counsel's analysis of the chances for success in the Second Circuit.'-61 Two of the comments are instructive:
Staffcounsel purported to speak knowledgeably on how the court was likely to
rule on the claims in an effort to pressure a withdrawal of the appeal. This
was confusing, at best, to a first time participant concerning the authority of
staff counsel and his representations on how the merits would be treated by
the court. If staff counsel were inclined to solicit the NLRB attorney's candid
appraisal of the case prior to the conference, those attorneys might be spared
the uncomfortable experience-reported by many-of watehing the other side
into abandoning a respectable-sometimes possibly a winningbrowbeaten
62
position.

The inexperienced lawyer, the one most in need of guidance from the
mediator, is the most vulnerable.
The risk of manipulation is especially great because most
mediators use a "caucus" method in which they meet with each side
outside the presence of the others.63 A mediator who is determined to
settle the case may simply evaluate the case differently for each party,
hoping to make at least one side significantly less optimistic. The case
will settle if that process is successful, albeit without regard to whose
case truly is weaker. One study of mediator behavior described this
process of "trashing" each side's case:
[Plaintiff's lawyer:] The mediator will tell you how bad your case is... try to
point out the shortcomings of the case to the parties and try to get the plaintiff
to be realistic. They point out that juries aren't coming back with a lot of
money anymore on these types of cases. They ask you tough questions to get
you to see that you might have a liability problem or the doctor says you don't
59. Some of the literature on mediation techniques encourages the manipulation and
coercion of parties. See Michele S.G. Hermann, Anatomy of Mediation,Mediate
Don't Litigate, 1990 J. DisP. RESOL. 201, 203-04 (1990)(book review).
60. See generally ANTHONY PAR=RDGE & ALLAN LINm, A REEVALUATION OF THE CIVIL
APPEALS MANAGEMENT PLAN (1983)(describing and analyzing the effect of
CAMP); Kaufinan, supra note 9, at 10-12.
61. PArRIDGE & LIND, supra note 60, at 66. It is important to note that this type of
response to the survey was the exception rather than the rule. Id. at 67. The
point for present purposes is that a full-time settler of cases has the incentive to
manipulates the process and at least some participants in the CAMP process detected such manipulation.
62. Id. at 66.
63. See generally BRAzIL, supranote 16, at 467-71 (describing caucus method in context of judicial mediation).
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have a permanent injury so you may get nothing. They will try to get you to
take a hard look at the deficiencies in your case.... [Defense lawyer:] He'll
then work through the case with us, pointing out outstanding medicals, lost
wages and other special damages, then tallying them up and a certain percentage of pain and suffering and come up with a figure. And then they may
discuss the strength of the case. rve had mediators say things to me in the
caucus such as, "I was impressed by the plaintiff; I think they're going
to be
64
believable. Have you factored that into your evaluation of the case"?

Another study concluded that mediators who use caucuses do emphasize different things to each side.65 If the mediator is trashing
both sides, he or she is not working to overcome the inexperience of

counsel by providing an experienced perspective, but rather playing
on that inexperience and the timidity that comes with it to achieve a
settlement, any settlement. The side with the more resolve, which is
probably the side with the more experienced and more expensive lawyer, emerges with the more favorable settlement.
Such behavior is not in the interest of justice because it settles
cases without regard to rights of the parties. Settlement processes
must be judged by whether their results are just.6 6 One proposed solution is to impose upon mediators a code of conduct, but many
mediators do not operate under such a code.67 Only Florida has a code
with provisions for its enforcement. 68 One federal district court recently attempted to deal with the ethical problems of referral mediation by requiring mediators to take the same oath that justices and
judges take.69 The available evidence, however, indicates that even
the few codes of conduct in effect are not helpful in controlling the
64. James J. Alfini, Trashing,Bashing,and HashingIt Out: Is This the End of "Good
Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66-68 (1991).
65. Katz, supra note 26, at 325.
66. See Hogan, supra note 16, at 437. See also CRAVER, supra note 41, at 306 (arguing that the judicial system must bear the responsibility if it assists in creating
unfair, one-sided settlements).
67. Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection,or Empowerment and Recognition?: The Mediator'sRole and Ethical Standardsin Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV.
253, 255 (1989). For a comprehensive bibliography regarding ethical problems in
mediation and a list of jurisdictions that have attempted to impose specific ethical obligations on mediators, see Robert B. Moberly, Ethical Standards For
Court-Appointed Mediators and Florida'sMandatory Mediation Experiment, 21
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 701, 704 n.n.15, 16, & 17 (1994).
68. Moberly, supra note 67, at 719.
69. Tentative guide to the S.D.N.Y. Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan,
1992 WL 518803 at *8 (July 10, 1992).
The oath is:
I,
do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will
administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the
poor and the rich, and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge
and perform all the duties incumbent upon me as
under
the Constitution and laws of the United States. So help me God.
28 U.S.C. § 453 (Supp. V 1993).
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mediators' behavior. 70 Indeed, it is hard to imagine how they could
when the behavior about which we are worried occurs in private, offthe-record conversations with people who are not in a position to know
they are being manipulated. The problem is a systemic one for referral mediation, and it arises in part because of the way referral
mediators are compensated.
ii. Why False Convergence Occurs
The mediator's incentive to manipulate the lawyers is financial,
and it exists regardless of whether the mediation is "in-house" or by
external referral. Although some referral programs rely on volunteers, many private mediators who participate in referral mediation
programs are compensated for their time and effort. 71 Lawyers are
increasingly making mediation a part of their practice. 7 2 Judge Harry
T. Edwards has observed that "some people have joined the ADR
bandwagon ... because they see it as a fast (and sometimes interest-

ing) way to make a buck" and that "It]here are now a number of selfproclaimed ADR 'experts,' with business cards in hand and consulting
firms in the yellow pages." 73 The few institutional mediation programs compensate their full-time mediators.
In either situation, the mediator's financial incentive is to settle
cases. Although the mediator does not operate on a contingent fee, the
private mediator who mediates to make money relies on repeat business.7 4 The institutional mediator needs to justify the expense of his
or her office. Because the judges who make the referrals are usually
interested in dispositions, the mediator's incentive is to have a high
"batting average" for cases settled.75 That batting average will justify
70.

H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEwAN, MEDIATION LAw, POLICY AND PRACTICE
(Supp. 1993)(citing ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH, THE DmEniAs OF MEDIATION

NANCY

95-96

A STmUY OF ETHICAL Dmmsris AND PoUcy IMPLICATIONS (NIDR
1992)).
71. See Brazil et al., supra note 45, at 284 (describing fixed, per case fee for evaluators in early neutral evaluation program). See also PROVINE, supra note 15, at
54 (describing how several districts handle the cost of settlement activities).
72. Goldberg et al., supra note 52, at 297.
73. Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARv. L. REV. 668, 668, 683 (1986). See alsoMarvin E. Aspen, SpecialMasters as
PRACTICE:

Mediators, in ADR AND THE CotRTs, supra note 15, at 225 (stating that senior

attorneys will command their usual hourly rate as mediators).
74. Kelly, supra note 15, at 135 ("Given an established pattern of successes, in time
these attorneys will be sought for their skills.").
75. Bush, supra note 67, at 260 (describing the focus on mediators' "settlement
rates"). See also Susan A. Fitzgibbon, Appellate Settlement Programs: A Case
Study, 1993 J. DirP. RESOL. 57, 82 (observing that abuses can stem from
mediators' perception that the success of a mediation program depends upon the
number of cases settled); ADR In D.C. Circuit Shows Promise, THIRD BRANCH
(Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.) Mar. 1990, at 1 (measuring success of
mediation program by high settlement rate).

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:712

the repeat business or the budget required by the mediator. Indeed, 7it6
is hard to imagine by what other criterion they would be evaluated.
The judge or the court administrator is not likely to take an independent look at the underlying fairness of each settlement achieved. They
will rely on the convenient assumption that the result must be fair
because the parties agreed to it, in turn ignoring the one reason why
mediation is necessary: the parties through their inexperienced lawyers are incapable of judging what is fair.
Professor Robert Baruch Bush has summarized this fear eloquently as follows:
If we adopt the efficiency conception, under which the mediator's primary role
is to simply reach agreements as expeditiously as possible, the effect is to create a role devoid of any clear ethical constraints on mediator behavior.
Mediators become little more than case-movers; the only performance standards are their agreement rates and time/cost figures. Such a conception creates perverse incentives; it opens the door to, and indeed encourages,
manipulative and coercive mediator behavior, especially in a process unconstrained by procedural or substantive rules or fear of publicity. Mediation becomes the "forced march to settlement" that many of its critics have rightly
decried. One might expect two possible outcomes from the adoption of such a
role for the mediator: disputants with any presence of mind simply will balk,
rendering the process useless; or disputants 77
with less presence of mind will be
intimidated, rendering the process abusive.

The incentives are to see that cases settle on any terms, without
regard to the fairness of the particular terms. 78 Referral mediation
must be judged with this fundamental flaw in mind.
2. Meeting ProceduralNeeds With Referral Mediation
a. How It Works
Referral mediators can help to a limited extent with the procedural
obstacles to settlement. Referral mediation can help to achieve a catharsis first by involving the parties directly in the settlement process. 7 9 The parties will feel unburdened because they have the chance

to tell their story to a neutral figure.8O A distinguished private mediator may also be able to convince the stubborn client of the realities of
the case, and the prospect of such a conversation may persuade the
76. Goldberg et al., supra note 52, at 298 (citing JAY FOLBERG AND ALLISON TAYLOR,
MEDIATION: A COMPREHENsIVE GUIDE TO RESOLvING CoNFIars WrrHoUT LrrGA-

77.
78.
79.
80.

TION 244 (1984))("[T]he quality of services cannot easily be judged by the results
obtained .... ).
Bush, supra note 67, at 264.
Id. at 261 ("A mediator focusing on reaching agreements, and doing so expeditiously, will inevitably be insensitive to protection of rights.").
Id. at 267. See also Menkel-Meadow, supra note 38, at 6; Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 13, at 504-05 ("[S]ettlement offers a different substantive process by allowing participation by the different parties as well as by the lawyers.").
Brazil et al., supra note 45, at 283. See Peckham et al., supra note 40, at 175.
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reluctant lawyer to come clean on the likely outcome of the case. This
is one reason why the personal presence of the client at the mediation
session is crucial. 8 ' Private mediation also provides a forum where
combative lawyers must meet and talk settlement in the presence of a
third party. The procedural problem with referral mediation, however, is not that it cannot work but that it is inferior in every respect
to judicial mediation.
b.

Why Referral Mediation Is Inferior Procedurally

The problem with the referral mediator is that he or she is just
another lawyer. The parties already have a lawyer, and they need
someone with more legitimacy, while the lawyers need someone with
more authority to overcome the procedural obstacles to settlement.82
A judge will better serve the parties' needs. A catharsis will occur
much more often when a judicial officer is involved.83 One magistrate
judge who has presided over hundreds of settlement conferences described the cathartic effect of the judge's presence:
Having a judge listen and show understanding for the litiganes concerns,
without passing judgment, is often more important than adding an extra
twenty percent to the settlement figure. A judge can make a valuable contribution to the parties' negotiation
process by allowing the clients time to ex84
press their views and feelings.

Judges are better mediators because litigants can express themselves to someone who embodies "the prestige and power of the judicial system."8 5 The deflation effect is also easier to achieve with a
81. See Kelly, supranote 15, at 136, 147 (stating that the secret is to get the clients to
"come to grips" with the situation). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(16)("If appropriate, the court may require that a party or its representative be present... in
order to consider possible settlement of the dispute."); G. Heileman Brewing Co.
v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989)(en banc) (affirming sanctioning
of corporation for failure to send representative to settlement conference); In re
LaMarre, 494 F.2d 753 (6th Cir. 1974); In re Air Crash Disaster at Stapleton Int'l
Airport, 720 F. Supp. 1433 (D. Colo. 1988); Lockhart v. Patel, 115 F.R.D. 44 (E.D.
Ky. 1987).
82. See Posner, supra note 10, at 392 ("Ihe client may wonder why he is hiring a
lawyer to argue before another lawyer, rather than hiring the second lawyer directly to receive authoritative legal advice."). See also Katz, supra note 26, at 330
(explaining that non-judicial settlement in L'Ambiance Plaza cases failed because
mediator lacked the necessary "status and authority").
83. One district's expense and delay reduction plan under the Civil Justice Reform
Act attempts to give referral mediators this stature by calling them "adjunct settlement judges." UNITED STATEs DsTmcrT COuRT, W.D. PA., Delay and Expense
Reduction Plan, 1993 WL 335784*21 (Oct. 1, 1993). Under the Civil Appeals
Management Plan of the United States Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit,
the in-house mediators did not, at first, dispel lawyers' mistaken impressions
that they should be addressed as, "your Honor." JERRY GOLDMAN, INEFFECTIVE
JUSTICE 30 (1980).
84. Hogan, supra note 16, at 445-46 (emphasis added).
85. Katz, supra note 26, at 307. As one magistrate explained:
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judge. Clients believe judges more than lawyers and are more likely
to be persuaded by hearing how a judge views their case than by hearing how another lawyer views it.86 The lawyers who need to level with
their clients are much more likely to do so ahead of time if they know
that the rosy expectations they have created are about to be punctured
by the judge. The lawyer will not want either the client's wrath or the
judge's disdain and, instead, will give reliable information about the
case. A mediation session with a judge also gives the lawyer authoritative ammunition with which to persuade a recalcitrant client that
settlement is the best course. 8 7 One judge has reported that his practice of telling the lawyers what the case is worth and telling them to
tell the clients that he said so was popular with counsel because
"[t]hey want to be able to go back to their clients and have some of the
load taken off their shoulders. They say, "Thisis what I think, but the
judge says this.'"88

The mediation session is also an opportunity for the judge to attempt to overcome hostility between lawyers.8 9 In attempts to create
[A judge) can permit parties... to vent their spleen to her in private
sessions, thus offering catharsis without carnage. More broadly, [the
judge] can, in effect, give the litigants their day in court, i.e., a chance to
tell their side of the story and to release their frustrations to a representative of the judicial branch. Such a "day in court" may be the only thing
a litigant needs to be sufficiently "emotionally cleared" to begin constructive settlement negotiations.
BRAZIL, supra note 16, at 95-96.
86. BRAZIL, supra note 16, at 98.
87.
One of the things the judge can do in this [settlement] conference is give
the lawyer something to take back to his client. After this pretrial conference, when the client asks about settlement, he wants to know what
the judge said. It gives the lawyer something to tell his client about
what the judge said.
WiLL Er AL., supra note 13, at 21 (remarks of Judge Rubin). See also Fitzgibbon,
supranote 75, at 81 ("In addition, an attorney who has overestimated the chance
for success on appeal or the risk of retrial may be better able to 'save face' in
suggesting a settlement to the client if it comes with the recommendation of an
active member of the court.").
88. J. Skelly Wright, The Pretrial Conference, 28 F.R.D. 141, 145 (1977). See also
Kristena A. LaMar, Pre-TrialSettlement Conferences in Multnomah County, 27
WILLLAMh

r L. REv. 549, 557 (1991)(stating that judges can help by giving their

"seal of approval" to what lawyer has been saying).
89. Judges have recognized this role for settlement conferences for some time. See
WILL ET AL., supra note 13, at 19.

It's important that you do several things at the pretrial conference. One
is to create an atmosphere where settlement can be discussed. One of
the impediments to settlement may have been some rancor between
counsel, some inability to communicate. There is some need by each
lawyer to enlist the judge's sympathy. They want a chance to tell their
story.
Id. (remarks of Judge Will). See also Levine, supra note 56, at 238 (observing
that early neutral evaluation session was able to change the tone of case to a
"civilized" one).
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a cooperative, working climate, some judges have arranged for lunch
with the lawyers and their clients and invited them to social evenings
together.9 0 Another attempts to overcome the "intractable belligerence" of counsel by holding conferences in a local coffee shop or while
strolling together in a local park. 9 ' If such tactics are not effective,
the judicial mediator is also much more likely to adjust the attitude of
combative trial lawyers. The presence of the judge improves the civility of lawyers and can keep them talking.92 With a judicial officer,
they know they are dealing with someone who has the authority to
enforce, and will enforce, appropriate standards of professional conduct. 93 No longer is the lawyer free to misbehave, secure in the
knowledge that the judge is not watching. The judge is there.9 4 Furthermore, the lawyer will be constrained by the likelihood that he or
she will have repeated interactions with the judge. In an urban trial
practice today, one can alienate other lawyers with little fear of retaliation in future cases. This is not so with the judge. Civility becomes
the order of the day, and settlement is more likely.
Thus, referral mediation is not a full solution to either the informational or the procedural needs of the parties and lawyers. The fear of
manipulation and the lack of legitimacy and authority in a non-judicial mediator both must raise doubts about the efficacy of this process.
A judicial officer, without the financial incentive to manipulate parties
and with the legitimacy and authority of office, is needed. The question is who that judicial officer should be.
B.

Trial Judge Mediation

The first judicial option is to have the district judge mediate his or
her own cases. The discussion of settlement as part of the Rule 16
pretrial conference is the most frequently used form of mediation in
the federal courts.9 5 It overcomes many of the problems of referral
mediation but creates others. It is better than referral mediation, but
it is not the answer.

90.
91.
92.
93.

WiLL RTAL., supra note 13, at 11, 23-24.
CoNN, supra note 33, at 7.
BRAzIL, supra note 34, at 46.
See, e.g., Dondi Properties Corp. v. Commerce Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284
(N.D. Tex. 1988)(en banc and per curiam)(adopting professionalism standards
pursuant to the inherent power of the court).
94. BRAZm, supranote 16, at 96 ("The presence of a judicial officer is especially likely

to" control bullying tactics.).
95. See JudicialConference of the United States, CiviL JUSTICE REFORM AcT REPoRT,
June 1, 1992, at 9.
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1. Meeting the Informational Needs of Settlement
a. Why Judges Are Better Than Lawyers
Experienced lawyers can help settle cases, but experienced judges
enjoy a special ability and credibility in assessing cases and therefore
have a unique ability to bring the parties' expectations together.9 6
Many have processed thousands of cases and thus their view on the
value of a case is entitled to, and will receive, extra respect. 97 Especially today, in an era of few civil trials, the trial judge will have more
experience with the results of trial than even the most experienced
lawyer. Their evaluations of a case are likely to be quite accurate.
They have no financial incentive to manipulate those predictions, and
lawyers rightly believe that the involvement of a judge makes a fair
settlement more likely.9 8
The trial judge is also more likely to bring the parties' expectations
together because the judge's evaluation has more credibility than that
of a non-judicial mediator. That credibility arises both from the reputation of the individual judge9 9 and the status of the judge's office.loo
As one retired judge-mediator in Florida told a researcher, "If you're a
retired judge you bring much more prestige to the mediation table
than just an attorney because the people look at this attorney and say,
'I have an attorney; what do I need this guy for?' A judge they listen
to."101

b. Why It Is Worrisome: The Potentialfor Coercion
The trial judge, however, can bring the parties together for reasons
other than the judge's expertise in assessing cases. The judge can coerce as well as inform. Although judges, unlike referral mediators,
have no financial incentive to coerce settlement, they have other reasons to do so. They have too much to do.102 They face peer pressure
among their fellow judges to keep their docket moving and to keep
96. BRAZIL, supra note 34, at 2 (reporting that a majority of lawyers surveyed believe
the judges' status and perspective give a "special potential" for assisting in
settlement).
97. BRAZIL, supra note 16, at 97-98.
98. BRAZIL, supra note 34, at 57.

99. Hogan, supra note 16, at 452 ("Te credibility that the parties place in a negotiation process supervised by a judge can at times be a direct function of the confidence they have in the person leading the process."). See also BRAZIL, supra note
34, at 45 ("[Glood judges become skillful at cutting through verbal and emotional
camouflage to identify pivotal issues, at ferreting out key evidence, assessing
credibility, and analyzing strengths and weaknesses of arguments.").
100. Katz, supranote 26, at 329-30 ("[Any judge has, by virtue of the office, considerable persuasive powers.").
101. Alfini, supra note 64, at 69. See also LaMar, supra note 88, at 557.
102. See, e.g., Anne C. Conway, First Impressions, LrrIG., Winter 1993, at 3.
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their dispositions high.103 The fear of coercion is what leads lawyers
overwhelmingly to prefer a judge other than the judge who
will pre04
side over the trial if a settlement conference is to occur.1

Some judges succumb to the pressure to coerce settlements,
although detection of such activity in chambers is difficult.105 One
survey of trial judges revealed that one-tenth of those surveyed described their typical practice as "interven[ing] aggressively through
the use of direct pressure."1 06 For example, Judge Weinstein of the
Southern District of New York had enormous success in settling the
Agent Orange litigation, but his tactics were considered coercive by
some. 10 7 Another judge took the direct approach and sanctioned a
party for refusing to settle, 0 8 despite the fact that the law is clear
that parties cannot and should not be forced to settle against their
will.' 0 9 The exasperation of the overworked trial judge with the positions parties take can and does lead to inappropriate pressure."3 0
103. BRAza, supra note 16, at 107 (discussing judges' incentives to settle cases). See

also Daisy Hurst Floyd, Can The Judge Do That?-The Need ForA ClearerJudicial Role In Settlement, 26 Am. ST. L.J. 45, 85 (1994)(discussing daily pressures
on judges to keep their dockets moving).
104. See BRAziL, supra note 34, at 67.

105. James A. Wall, Jr. & Lawrence F. Schiller, JudicialInvolvement in Pre-TrialSettlement: A Judge is not a Bump on a Log, 6 Am. J. TPiJL AnVoc. 27, 32-33
(1982)(citing examples). See also Katz, supranote 26, at 305 (quoting one judgemediator: "I don't want to hear any law, any facts, any theories of liability. Ijust
want to know how much you are going to pay.").
106. Alschuler, supra note 11, at 1829 (quoting J. RYAN ET AL., AamIcAN TRALm
JUDGEs: THEm WoRK STYLEs AND PERFORMANCES

177 (1980)).

107. Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. Cmi. L. REv. 337, 360-61 (1986).
108. Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985).
109. G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir.
1989)(en banc)(quoting Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 669 (2d Cir. 1985)).
110. In G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989)(en
banc), Judge Coffey in dissent described the statement of one district judge who
had no hesitation about exercising his authority to resolve a matter:
I will tell you now that I am through with the Department of Labor's
waltzing around, taking ridiculous positions, and saying that this is the
Government. The Government is the Secretary of Labor, so far as I am
concerned. And I want to see him at 10:00 o'clock on the 23rd of April in
this courtroom to tell me why the Secretary of Labor is taking these idiotic positions.
Id. at 661. The former Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, Harris L. Winter, expressed his fears on this point as follows:
I think that a judge should confine himself to a very limited role in seeking settlements. Perhaps I am a bit gun-shy from my experience over
the years. As a practicing lawyer I had some bad experiences, and resented greatly what I considered to be improper pressure from a judge to
settle a case. I know that some judges have a reputation among the bar
as improperly pressing for settlements and in some instances, I regret to
say, I think the reputation is well deserved.... My experience [with
judges exerting pressure to settle] has been that it is not just a "little"
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A trial judge determined to settle a case has enormous power to
coerce a settlement.' 1 The court can threaten to remove a case from
the trial docket.112 The court can instill in the parties a fear of retaliation which makes a trial an unappealing alternative to almost any
settlement. 1 3 The court can create that fear by intimating how the
court will rule on particular matters such as admissibility of crucial
evidence, choice of law, or immunity.11 4 The judge can play on the
fears of the lawyers who have other cases to come before that judge
and fear alienating the court."15 Ajudge simply has countless ways to
use his or her discretion to nudge a reluctant party toward making a
deal.116
The possibility of coercion by the trial judge, like the possibility of
manipulation by the referral mediator, means that cases may settle on
terms and for reasons other than the underlying justice of the dispute.
Such settlements are unacceptable. The parties need to obtain the information about the value of the case from someone without the incentive to manipulate or the power to coerce them.

111.

112.
113.

114.
115.
116.

pressure; it is a great deal of pressure, and what I consider to be improper pressure. That is why I am so leery about the idea of having a
judge press for settlement. It is a very narrow path that he can follow,
and it is very easy for him to over-step it and unduly or improperly influence one of the parties to accept a disposition.
Chief Judge Winter Shares Views On Caseload,Settlement Roles, Opinion-Writing Practices, THum BRANCH (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.) Aug.
1987, at 1, 8. See also Lucy v. Katz, Compulsory Alternative Dispute Resolution
and Voluntarism: Two-headed Monster or Two Sides of the Coin, 1993 J. DLsp.
REsOL. 1, 41 (stating that litigants are pressured in "the give and take" of settlement conferences). But see Steven Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 505, 511 (1984)(arguing that coercion happens
infrequently).
See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13, at 505. See also Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JuDicATuRE 161, 163-65
(1986)(commenting on the frequency with which decisions by judges on preliminary motions lead to settlement).
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13, at 509.
Comment, Mandatory Mediation and Summary Jury Trial: Guidelinesfor EnsuringFairand Effective Processes, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1086, 1098 (1990)("When
judges mediate or conduct [a summary jury trial] prior to a trial over which they
will preside, parties are more likely to feel pressure to settle if they believe the
judge wants settlement and thus might rule against the reluctant party at
trial."). See also BRAziL, supra note 16, at 105 (reporting that lawyers who were
surveyed feared retaliation when trial judge's settlement advice was rejected).
See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 107, at 344 (discussing how Judge Weinstein exerted
influence on parties to settle the Agent Orange litigation).
Leroy J. Tornquist, The Active Judge In PretrialSettlement: InherentAuthority
Gone Awry, 25 WIa rrE L. Rav. 743, 753 (1989).
Schuck, supra note 107, at 358. See also E. Donald Elliott, ManagerialJudging
and the Evolution of Procedure,53 U. CHi. L. Rv. 306, 323-25 (1986)(describing
how a managerial judge could manage a case in such a way that it would settle
rather than go to trial); Resnik, supra note 11, at 552.
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2. The ProceduralProblems of Trial Judge Mediation
As discussed above, judicial mediation is much preferable to referral mediation as a procedural matter. The parties' needs for a catharsis and deflation, and the lawyers' needs for an authoritative third
party, are better served when a judge is involved. There are significant problems, however, with the process of trial judge mediation. In
addition to the obvious problem that a truly vindictive judge may tilt
the scales of justice against a party who refuses to settle, there are two
other problems: preconceptions of the merits of a case and disclosure
to the court of information that is irrelevant to the trial.
a. PrematureDecisionmaking
Settlement discussions will involve the disclosure of information
about the merits of the case and the information that will be presented
at trial.117 Although necessary, this disclosure will not be in the full
glory of adversarial trial. The lawyers will summarize evidence but
not be permitted to cross-examine witnesses during a mediation. 1 18
The trial judge who participates in mediation may, indeed must,119
form judgments about the case and how it should come out and share
those with the lawyers. Although one would hope that those judgments are reliable, 12 0 they cannot be permitted to become self-fulfilling. The judge may become psychologically committed to one view of
the case-the view he or she expresses in the privacy of chambers during the court-sponsored mediation-and be unable to2shake that conception even in the face of evidence to the contrary.' '
117. See supra section Hl.A, regarding the necessity of predicting the outcome if settlement is to occur.
118. See WmL T AL.., supra note 13, at 9 ("I don't make assumptions out of the blue. I
make assumptions on representations of counsel as to what they think the evidence will be.")(remarks of Judge Will).
119. Judge Merhige's policy is to avoid talking about numbers in order to avoid prejudicing his rulings later. Id. at 13. The problem is that the judge cannot give any
guidance, cannot help the lawyers come to convergent expectations, without talking about numbers. Judge Merhige's approach preserves impartiality at the cost
of effectiveness.
120. If even the judge's assessments are not reliable, then it is hard to imagine how
any mediation could help overcome the informational obstacles to settlement.
The parties could not rely on the judge's assessments and would not do so. They
would be as much in the dark as before.
121. See Alschuler, supranote 11, at 1835 ("Without affording the parties a full opportunity to be heard, a 'managerial' judge may, in effect, decide a case and encourage settlement on terms that correspond to his barely provisional views.").
Judge Merhige described his attempt to avoid this type of commitment as follows:
You're not making any ruling. I tell them that a judge, speaking for myself, is like the third baseball umpire. The first baseball umpire said, "I
call them as I see them" The second baseball umpire said, "Not me, I
call them as they are." The third umpire said, 'They ain't nothing until I
call them"
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One district judge, in describing a hypothetical case, "quoted" himself as suggesting to a plaintiff in a settlement conference that a jury
verdict in the amount sought might require a remittitur or new
trial.122 That is precisely the kind of information necessary for the
predictive settlement conference to work: the lawyer has received
some valuable information from a reliable source about the likely
damages in the case. However, if the case does not settle, can the
judge objectively evaluate after hearing all the evidence whether a total victory for the plaintiff should be reduced or set aside? The risk
that the judge will be wedded to his or her preconception, or feel compelled to carry out the implied threat of a new trial in order not to be
perceived as weak, is real. Even if this judge waited to make up his or
her mind, the appearance of impartiality may have been compromised.123 Yet a motion to recuse on this basis will fail.124 Someone
other than the judge who will preside over trial needs to conduct the
mediation.
b.

Reluctance to Share CrucialInformation

Another problem with the use of the trial judge to perform the mediation is that mediation requires the parties to negotiate and exchange information. Often, information relevant to settlement is
irrelevant to adjudication, and parties justifiably fear that revelations
that might help settlement will taint a later trial if mediation is unsuccessful.125 Precisely this concern excludes from evidence at trial
statements made in the course of settlement.1 26 Parties may not be
candid with the trial judge in a settlement conference.1 2 7 To permit
the judge who will officiate at trial to conduct the mediation risks
either unproductive negotiations because the parties withhold their
WILL ET AL., supra note 13, at 12.
122. WILL ET AL., supra note 13, at 5 (remarks of Judge Will).
123. LACEY, supra note 34, at 2. See also Harry M. Fisher, JudicialMediation: How It
Works Through Pre-Trial Conference, 10 U. Cm. L. Rav. 453, 455 .(1944)("Lawyers would feel, rightfully so, that no judge could successfully detach himself from
the information absorbed during the conference or escape forming views on the
merits of the case which might unconsciously color his rulings at trial.").
124. Pau v. Yosemite Park and Curry Co., 928 F.2d 880 (9th Cir. 1991); Franks v.
Nimno, 796 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. Honaker Mills Div. of Top Form
Mills, 789 F.2d 262, 265 (1986); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3rd Cir.
1980) cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Fong v. American Airlines, Inc., 431 F.
Supp. 1334 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
125. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 13, at 511. See also Judith Resnik, Managerial
Judges, 96 HARv. L. REy. 374, 408-09 (1982)(describing how judges who involve
themselves at the pretrial stage in "managing" cases may learn much more about
the parties and the dispute than would be acceptable at trial).
126. FED. R. EWiD. 408.
127. Wayne D. Brazil, Settling Civil Cases: What Lawyers Want from Judges, JUDGES
J. Summer 1984, at 14, 19.
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true interests or a tainted trial process because the judge knows information he or she should not, or both.128
In summary, trial judges are better situated than referral
mediators to overcome the informational and procedural obstacles of
settlement. Yet using the trial judge as a settlement officer creates
additional risks of coercion and of a tainted process not present when
the mediator is uninvolved in the trial if settlement does not occur.
The ideal settlement officer would combine the expertise, legitimacy,
and authority of the trial judge with the distance of the referral mediator. The magistrate's position is evolving in ways that make that
combination possible.
C.

Magistrate Mediation
1.

InformationalRole: Credible Convergence Without Coercion

As discussed in Part II, the informational role of the mediator is to
bring the parties to convergent expectations about the outcome of the
case because most lawyers do not have, and cannot get, the kind of
trial experience necessary to give reliable predictions. Because they
try more cases than any lawyer could and enjoy special credibility that
makes their predictions more likely to be believed, judges are better
than referral mediators at overcoming informational obstacles. Magistrates are emerging as effective mediators in part because their experience, and the lawyers' and parties' perceptions, are giving them
the expertise and the credibility they need to be effective. Furthermore, their unique position as neither a referral mediator in need of
repeat business nor the trial judge in need of an additional disposition
lessens the fears of manipulation or coercion of the parties.
a.

Changes in the Magistrate'sRole and Experience

The Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 left largely undefined what
duties the magistrates could undertake.129 Their duties were defined
by the district judges in each district, resulting in differing authority
128. Professor Menkel-Meadow has noted:
[I]f settlement processes are to be conducted within the courts, they
should be facilitated by those who will not be the ultimate triers of fact.
Because I believe that good settlement practice frequently depends on
the revelation of facts that would be inadmissible in court, the facilitator
of settlement cannot be the same person who will ultimately find facts or
decide the outcome of the case. In some courts this will mean the use of
magistrates, and in others it will mean rotating judges through cases on
other dockets.

Menkel-Meadow, supra note 38, at 43.
129. Pub. L. No. 90-578, tit. I, § 101, 82 Stat. 1113 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)
(1968)), amended by Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 2, 93 Stat. 643 (1979).
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from district to district.130 Some districts authorized magistrates to
hold civil trials upon the consent of the parties.'31 To remove any controversy about the practice, Congress amended the Magistrates Act in
1979.132 Today, magistrates have the undoubted authority to conduct
complete civil trials upon consent of all parties.133
Magistrates are trying more civil cases. Magistrates conducted
825 civil trials in 1982.134 In 1992, magistrates held 1368 consensual
civil trials.135 From 1991 to 1992 alone, the number of civil jury trials
conducted by magistrates increased by twenty-four percent while the
number of civil non-jury trials increased twenty-two percent.13 6 The
significance of these numbers is that magistrates are gaining precisely
the type of experience that will enable them to help parties come to
convergent expectations about the outcome of cases. As the magistrates try more cases, they gain greater insight into the likely impact
of evidence, theories, and recovery on a judge or jury. They bring increasing expertise to the settlement conference.
Recent legislation may accelerate the trend. Before 1990, neither
the district judge nor the magistrate was permitted to tell the parties
of their option to consent to trial before the magistrate. To prevent
coercion, only the clerk of court could do so. Now, the district judge
and magistrate may tell the parties of their option.13 7 If as a result
more parties avail themselves of the magistrate as a trial judge, the
130. SmITH, supra note 13, at 65-111. See also Christopher E. Smith, JudicialLobbying And Court Reform: U.S. Magistrate Judges and the JudicialImprovements
Act of 1990, 14 U. Aim LrrrL= ROCK L.J. 163, 175 (1992)[hereinafter Smith, Lobbying and Reform] citing GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE U.S. MAGISTRATES:
How THEIR SERVICES HAvE ASSISTED THE ADMINISTRATION OF SEVERAL DmTmcT
CouRTs: MORE IMPROvEmENTs NEEDED 9 (1974).
131. Smith, Lobbying and Reform, supra note 130, at 176.
132. Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643.
133. The Magistrates Act provides that:
Upon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States Magistrate or
a part-time United States Magistrate who serves as a full-time judicial
officer may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case, when specially designated to exercise such jurisdiction by the district court or courts he
serves.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1)(1988). One study of magistrates' roles defined this type of
role as that of "Additional Judge." Carroll Seron, Magistrates and the Work of
FederalCourts: A New Division of Labor, 69 JUDICATURE 353, 356 (1986).
134. 1992 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 83, tbl. 16.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Before the law was changed, it read:
[T]he clerk of court shall, at the time the action is filed, notify the parties
of their right to consent to the exercise of such jurisdiction. The decision
of the parties shall be communicated to the clerk of court. Thereafter,
neither the district judge nor the magistrate shall attempt to persuade
or induce any party to consent to reference of any civil matter to a
magistrate.
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magistrates will be that much better able to assess the value of cases
and accordingly that much better able to render useful assistance in
mediation of other cases.
Those assessments will also improve because the office of magistrate is becoming more attractive to more qualified individuals. In
1981, magistrates earned seventy-six percent of what district judges
made.138 In recent years, Congress has pegged magistrates salaries
at ninety-two percent of the salary for an Article III judge.13 9 This tie
to the Article 1TI judiciary is an important step for magistrates as a
demonstration of their importance to the judicial system. In addition,
with recent changes in the compensation for Article HI judges,140
magistrate compensation has increased to $120,000 per year. The increased compensation, and its tie to the Article III judiciary, will attract more experienced and qualified applicants. The combination of
increased civil trial experience and better credentials is improving the
ability of magistrates to help parties overcome the informational obstacles to settlement.
b. Changes in the Perception of the Magistrate
Even the best evaluation of a case will not affect settlement if it is
not believed. Overcoming the informational obstacles to settlement
requires that the parties place great faith in the mediator's assessment of the case. The perception of the magistrate as well as the reality, thus, is important.'41 The evidence indicates that the perception
of magistrates is improving and will continue to improve. The increased number of parties consenting to trial before the magistrate is
itself some evidence of confidence in the magistrates' abilities. At
least one of the Advisory Groups under the Civil Justice Reform Act
noted the increasing awareness of lawyers and litigants of the abilities
of magistrates, although the report lamented the speed with which
that perception was spreading.142
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2)(1988). The 1990 amendment permits district judges and
magistrates to advise the parties of this option. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2)(Supp. V
1993). See generally Smith, Lobbying and Reform, supra note 130, at 193.

138.

JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATES SYST6M, REPORT
To THE CONGRESS 33 (Dec. 1981)[hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THI U.S.].

139. 28 U.S.C. § 634(a)(Supp. V 1993). See also Smith, Lobbying and Reform, supra
note 130, at 179 (citing Bankruptcy Judges,Magistrates Gain New Benefits; New
Bankruptcy Judges Created,THmD BRANCH (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Wash.,
D.C.) Nov. 1988, at 3).
140. Effective January 1, 1992, district judges' salaries increased to $129,500. Exec.
Order No. 12,786, 56 Fed. Reg. 67,453, 67,458 (1991).
141. Frances E. McGovern, Use ofMagistratesand Masters in Complex Litigation, in
ADR AND THE CouRTs, supra note 15, at 221, 223 (observing that magistrate mediation will be successful only if "the attorneys have great confidence in the...
magistrat's ability and fairness").
142. FnrAL REPORT, supra note 22, at 80.
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Another important recent development that will give the magistrates increased credibility has been the magistrates' successful effort
to secure the title "Judge." The title had been given to magistrates in
some districts for years but deliberately denied to magistrates in other
districts.i 43 Magistrates feared that the term "magistrate" instead of
judge was confusing and "invite[d] comparisons to odious experiences
with 'magistrates' and justices of the peace in judicial systems of some
states."' 44 Magistrates very much desired to have their status increased by the more customary and prestigious title, "Judge." After
intense efforts,'4 5 magistrates recently obtained the official title "Magistrate Judge."i 46 No longer can there be any doubt that magistrates
are entitled to the important status of being called judge. Accordingly,
their assessments of cases in settlement conferences will be given
more weight.' 4 7 They are better equipped to help parties settle cases
on fair terms.
143. See SMITH, supra note 13, at 80-81 (describing the difference between how magistrates are addressed in one district and how they are addressed in another). The
sensitivity of this issue is hard to overstate. As Professor Smith described in another piece:
At an annual training conference for magistrates from three federal circuits, one magistrate addressed his colleagues about the potential for
obtaining litigants' consent for magistrate-supervised civil trials through
the use of the title "judge." He concluded his remarks by shaking his
head with an expression of sad disbelief, saying "there are still district
judges out there who won't allow magistrates to be called judge.'"
Whereupon a magistrate, from a district noted for its conflicts between
judges and magistrates, yelled from the audience, "No kidding!"
Although the magistrates at the conference laughed in commiseration
with their colleague, the emphasis given to the subject by the speaker
and the abrupt inteijection by the magistrate in the audience indicated
the heartfelt importance which title and other aspects of status have for
subordinate judicial officers.
Christopher E. Smith, The Development of a Judicial Office: United States Magistrates and the Struggle for Status, 14 J. LEGAL PROF. 175, 182-83 (1989).
144. JUDICLAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supranote 138, at 60, quoted in Smith, Lobbyig and Reform, supra note 130, at 181.
145. Those efforts are the primary focus of Smith, Lobbying and Reform, supra note
130.
146. The magistrates obtained this new title as part of the Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 631 (Supp. V
1993)).
147. The chairman of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Administration of the
Magistrate Judges System described the importance of the change in title as follows: "It may seem like a small thing, but I think that the statute conferring the
title magistrate judge has been a very important step in both the maturation of
the magistrate judge system and the way that magistrate judges are perceived by
members of the community." Judge Wayne E. Alley: The Growing Role of the
MagistrateJudge, THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.) Sept.
1992, at 10, 11.
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c. Lack of Incentive to Manipulate or Coerce

Fears of manipulation and coercion are much less necessary with
magistrates than with referral mediators and trial judges. The magistrate can help the parties' expectations to converge without encountering the problems of the referral or institutional mediator who relies
upon a "batting average" of settled cases to justify repeat business or
continued funding of institutionalized mediation. The magistrate is in
a position to seek only just settlements. The magistrate has the security of a definite term of office-eight years for full-time magistratesand so is not dependent for continued livelihood of a record of dispositions. Furthermore, to the extent that magistrates are subject to nonrenewal at the end of their term, settlement is only one of many tasks
performed by them and thus is unlikely to be a source of overwhelming pressure to settle cases at the cost ofjustice. 148 The temptation to
manipulate the settlement process to justify one's place in it is not as
great when there is a definite term of office and other bases for defending one's place.
Furthermore, unlike the trial judge mediator, the magistrate will
not be able to coerce settlements when the parties have not consented
to trial before the magistrate. Magistrate mediation insulates the
trial from the settlement discussions.149 The parties always have the
resort of trial. The magistrate thus can feel free to become deeply involved in settlement in innovative ways.150 A survey of lawyers concluded, not surprisingly, that they believed that settlement
conferences should be conducted by judges other than the trial judge,
and their worries "about the propriety of judicial participation in settlement all but evaporates.., when the judicial officer who hosts the
148. Hogan, supra note 16, at 437 (explaining that judges take oath of office that commits them to fairness). Professor Christopher Smith has expressed some doubt
about this point after extensive observations of magistrates in action:
While magistrates may conscientiously seek to encourage fair settlements, they also have an interest in the judicial system's goals of minimizing the number of cases that go to trial in order to save the system's
resources. The fact that many magistrates view a successful case settlement as a "victory" indicates that they are not strictly impartial
facilitators who are ambivalent about whether a litigant insists upon
taking a case to trial.
SMITH, supra note 13, at 164.
149. See Linda J. Silberman, Magistratesand Masters, PartI: The English Model, 50
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1070 (1975)(discussing the English system of using masters to
accomplish the same objective). The argument is one of analogy, since masters do
not participate in settlement discussions in Great Britain. Id. at 1111 & n.70. See
also Flanders, supra note 110, at 521 (making the same analogy).
150. SissI, supra note 13, at 130. It must be noted that Professor Smith found the
potential for coercion even in these situations inappropriate. Id.
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settlement conference is not the judge to whom the case has been assigned for trial."'l5
Thus, of the three types of mediation, magistrate mediation is superior in overcoming the informational obstacles to settlement. Magistrates are gaining in experience and prestige. Magistrates bring
their new-found ability and credibility to the table and will be better
able to guide parties to realistic, convergent expectations. Furthermore, their evaluations will be believed. In addition, there is less fear
of manipulation or coercion. There remains, however, the evaluation
of the ability of magistrates to assist with the procedural obstacles to
settlement.
2. MagistrateMediation and ProceduralSatisfaction
As discussed above, what parties need from the settlement process
is a catharsis and a deflation. Magistrates are now in a better position
than ever to provide both. The litigant who unburdens himself to the
magistrate is talking not only to a disinterested third party but also to
someone with the trappings and the title of judicial office. It is one
thing for a party to tell her story to her lawyer or to an another lawyer
appointed or employed to mediate the case. It is quite another to walk
into the chambers of a judicial officer with the title of judge and the
accoutrements of office and tell that same story. The satisfaction of
participating in the resolution of the dispute in this official and impressive setting is significantly different and much more likely to lead
to settlement. The catharsis is dependent upon the party's perception
of the legitimacy of the forum, and the magistrate, as judge, has become more legitimate. Deflation also is more likely. As discussed
above, a client who is out of control may see reason if the bad news
comes from a judge. A lawyer who is reluctant to deliver the bad news
will know that he or she will have many other occasions to interact
with the magistrate and thus will have an incentive to give realistic
advice before the magistrate does so. The key is that the magistrate is
a judicial officer and now is more likely to be perceived as one.
The increasing status of the magistrate also lends increasing authority to the mediation process.' 5 2 Magistrates are in an excellent
position to control attorney incivility. First, the magistrates are prob151. Alschuler, supra note 11, at 1849 n.172.

152. Professor Smith's research led him to this conclusion:
The magistrates recognize the value of high status. The title "Judge"
creates a clear image in the minds of lawyers and parties about expected
deference and appropriate formal behavior in the presence of an identifiable judicial officer. Magistrates have, in effect, a more authoritative
voice when ruling on motions, guiding settlement negotiations, and undertaking other judicial tasks within their authority as federal judicial
officers.
SMITH, supra note 13, at 80-81 (emphasis added).
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ably the judicial officers who are most likely to be familiar with the
phenomenon, having fought in the trenches of discovery warfare for
years. Second, such behavior is usually best controlled when a judicial
officer is present to referee. One conference observed by Professor
Christopher Smith began to degenerate when a lawyer sarcastically
accused another lawyer of misrepresenting the facts of an earlier dispute. The magistrate scolded the attorney with the desired effect.153
The fact that the lawyers will have repeat business with the magistrate will also help keep them under control. In fact, they probably
will have more frequent interaction with the magistrate than with the
district judge and thus will have more incentive to appear reasonable
in front of the magistrate.
Thus, magistrate mediation also has significant procedural advantages over other forms. It combines the legitimacy and authority of
judicial office with the insulation of the non-judicial mediator. The
magistrate is in a unique position to help parties overcome the obstacles to settlement without encountering the problems of referral mediation and trial judge mediation. But other factors, in addition to this
unique position of the magistrate, are making magistrate mediation
more necessary and more likely. These factors concern how the district judge should, and how the magistrate will, spend his or her time.
IV. THE USES OF JUDICIAL TIME
A.

Trial Judges: Should They Spend Time in Mediation?

One solution to the problems of trial judge mediation is to have
trial judges swap cases.1 54 Mediation under such a system has the
virtues of judicial mediation without the baggage of coercion or a
tainted process. There are other problems, however, and not all of
them can be solved by a buddy system. The brutal fact of the matter is
that federal trial judges do not have time to devote to assisting settle153. Id. at 100-01.
154. See, e.g., PRovn4E, supra note 15, at 21 ("Some judges exchange cases with colleagues in order to avoid the possibility that the settlement judge will also try the
case."). See also WmL ET AL., supra note 13, at 24, in which Judge Merhige described this process as follows:
Instead of running a risk of being required to reassign the case, you can
work with someone else on the court in a buddy system for talking settlement. We do that quite commonly on our court. Not all judges are
equally good at it. Not all judges are equally willing to swap off. But if
you find someone on your court who shares the same attitude that you
have, it's a very useful device to be able to call a week before trial and
say, "Joe, rye got this case. It's going to take three weeks to try, and I
think some settlement discussions would be helpful and it's a nonjury
case. Could you spare a couple of hours?"
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ment negotiations at the level of detail required to do any good.' 5 5
Furthermore, at least some of the impediments to settlement have
their roots in the size of the criminal docket and the resulting paucity
of civil trials. Whatever time is left for the civil docket will be more
profitably spent trying civil cases than settling them.
1.

Trials and the Generation of Results

An experienced trial judge can settle cases by helping parties to
make better predictions about how the case will come out. The reasons why parties need assistance in making those predictions, however, is that the lawyers are inexperienced and there are not enough
cases being tried to give reliable guidance. The trial judge may do
more for settlement by bypassing settlement conferences in favor of
holding trials. Trial judges need to preside over trials to ensure that
there are enough trial results to give negotiated settlements some basis in reality.1 5 6 Trial judges may also better spend their time deciding new legal questions that, when the opinion is published, will
resolve numerous other disputes.1 5 7 If the problem is information, as
it is in part, then the trial judge helps more by generating that information in a public trial or opinion than by whispering it to parties in
settlement caucuses.
2.

Trial Dates and the Generation of Settlements

Other problems with unassisted settlement include, as previously
discussed, the lawyer who does not tell the client the truth about his
or her chances at trial or who refuses to be civil to the opposing attor155. The need for the mediator to be immersed in the case is hard to overstate. To

predict the outcome, the mediator will need to know the case thoroughly. To deflate clients credibly, the mediator will need to be able to recite chapter and verse
to them about the weaknesses of their case. To achieve catharsis, the mediator
must sit and listen for as long as it takes. All of these steps can take a significant
amount of time. Professor Janet Cooper Alexander has written:
[A] settlement judge cannot serve as an effective evaluator or negotiator
unless she is familiar with both the substantive law and the evidence in
the case. This requires detailed preparation; indeed settlement conference briefs can be as lengthy as pretrial memoranda. Moreover, the effective settlement judge applies her own creative legal thinking to the
case. She must figure out how the issues fit together, which ones are
proving an obstacle to a negotiated resolution, and how to break the
logjam.... [Slettlement often requires intense, energetic work by the
judge. She must schedule and run numerous meetings in which she cajoles, berates, reasons, and remonstrates with and just plain wears down
lawyers, parties, and insurers.
Alexander, supra note 23, at 651.
156. Longan, supra note 1, at 682-95.
157. Resnik, supra note 125, at 422 (commenting on the difficulty of measuring the
quality of judicial output because of the possibility that one disposition may resolve many other disputes).
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ney. Nothing makes lawyers see their cases more clearly than the
dawn of the first day of trial.s5 8 The lawyer who has not been realistic
with the client may prefer the abuse of the client to the humiliation of
public defeat. That choice only becomes real when trial approaches.
Similarly, the Mr. Hyde lawyer may become Dr. Jekyll when it becomes clear that the case may be decided by public trial rather than by
deposition-room intimidation. Believable trial dates galvanize
settlement.
It may be that "the best that judges can do to promote good settlements is to adjudicate as many cases as possible to make clear the
alternative to consensual agreement."' 5 9 One trial judge who spent
considerable time in settlement conferences concluded that the same
results would have followed from setting a firm trial date.160 Many

other judges and observers have reached much the same conclu-

sion.1 6 1 One prominent federal judge, the late Robert Peckham, concluded that judges who spend time on settlements are actually less
productive than judges who keep their cases moving toward trial.62
Taking the trial judges out of settlement conferences will leave them
more time to try cases. Once the word gets out that trial has become a
more likely alternative, the lawyers and parties may find it easier to
settle more cases without assistance. Trial is a better use of the district judge's time than settlement.
158. See CONN, supra note 33, at 13 ("Until lawyers feel the icy lump of anxiety in
their bellies, they do not evaluate their cases in earnest.").
159. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 38, at 33 n.169. See also ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM
URY, GETTING To YES 101-11 (1981)(a standard text on negotiation strategy).
Fisher and Ury emphasize that parties must evaluate their BATNA (the best
alternative to a negotiated agreement) in formulating negotiation strategies. If
the BATNA for a party to litigation is immediate trial on the merits, settlement
may be much more likely. Id.
160. Helda R. Gage, How to Reduce the Docket, 23 JUDGES J. 12, 15 (1984). See also
CRAVER, supranote 41, at 283 (arguing that settlement is much more likely if the
case is moving "inexorably toward trial").
161. See LACEY, supranote 34, at 9-11 ('The routinely mailed notice [from the court] is
important because it sets deadlines, including the greatest of all settlement inducements, the trial date."). See also BROOINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION 17 (1989)(recommending that every
federal district court be required to set early and firm trial dates for all noncomplex cases); PRESSENTS COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL

JUSTICE REFORM 7, 19 (Aug. 1991)(urging judges to set early trial dates and to
allow delay only for compelling reasons); WILL ET AL., supra note 13, at 17 (remarks of Judge Rubin)("CTlhere isn't any settlement device better than a firm
trial date that the lawyers can't get continued.").
162. Robert F. Peckham, A JudicialResponse To The Cost ofLitigation: Case Management, Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37
RUTG SaS
L. REv. 253, 267 (1985)(citing FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, CASE MANAGENET AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COUrTS 37-39
(1977)). See also Tornquist, supra note 115, at 762-63 (describing empirical evidence on this point as "mixed").
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Magistrates: Do They Have Time for Mediation?

One of the most vigorous supporters of alternative dispute resolution in the federal courts has opposed using magistrates as mediators
6
because of the burden of other activities such as pretrial disputes.1 3
Magistrate mediation in at least one magistrate's experience has averaged two to three hours per case. 16 4 That figure probably is conservative. There is room for hope, however, that magistrates may be able to
make a significant contribution to mediation efforts because the primary source of docket pressure does not affect them as much as it affects district judges, and recent changes in the discovery rules have
the potential of lifting some of the burden of discovery disputes from
the magistrates' shoulders. Also, there may be some relief in sight
from the flood of prisoner cases handled by magistrates.
1.

CriminalJurisdiction

The single biggest impediment to giving civil cases adequate attention is the criminal docket.165 The number of felony cases commenced
in the district courts grew from 21,042 (with a total of 32,366 defendants) in 1982 to 34,119 (with a total of 53,260 defendants) in 1992.166
The pressure of trying to give speedy trials to accused criminals is
likely to increase. The crime bill recently signed by President Clinton
creates nineteen new categories of federal felonies, from drive-by
shootings to telemarketing fraud.167 The most time-consuming aspect
of the criminal docket is the criminal trial, particularly the large,
multi-defendant criminal trial.16s A major reason district judges cannot mediate significant numbers of civil cases effectively is simply that
the criminal docket requires too much of their time.
Magistrates, however, do not bear as much of the burden of the
criminal cases because they may not preside over felony trials.169 To
be sure, the magistrates are affected indirectly because they do have a
163. Peckham, supra note 162, at 274.
164. PRovmn, supra note 15, at 85.
165. Longan, supra note 1, at 672-77.
166. 1982 ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE AiImiN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTs., tbl. D-1
[hereinafter 1982 ANNuAL REPORT]; 1992 ANmuAL REPORT, supra note 14, at tbl.

D-1.
167. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 55 Crim. Law Rep.
(BNA) 2431 (1994).
168. For example, in fiscal 1992, there were 104 criminal cases that were in trial for 20
days or more. All together, they used 3811 days of federal trial time. 1992 AN-

supra note 14, at 223-25, tbl. C-9. See also CriminalTrials Dominate District Courts' Workload, THIR BRANcH (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts.,
Wash., D.C.) Sept. 1993, at 4-5 (noting that multi-defendant cases take roughly
NUAL REPORT,

twice as long, per defendant, to try).

169.

SMITH,

supra note 13, at 26. See also United States v. Jenkins, 734 F.2d 1322

(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985).
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limited criminal jurisdiction.17o Among the preliminary criminal matters handled by magistrates are search warrants, arrest warrants,
summonses, initial appearances, preliminary examinations, grand
jury sessions, and arraignments.171 In addition, under the Bail Reform Adt, the magistrate has the responsibility for holding hearings
and making findings regarding the eligibility of accused persons for
bail.172 Magistrates also conduct pretrial conferences in criminal
cases, decide some motions subject to appeal for abuse of discretion or
error of law, and hear other motions and make findings of fact subject
to de novo review.173 The magistrates' lack of authority to try felony
criminal cases, however, at least buffers them from the worst effects of
the burgeoning criminal docket and potentially leaves them with more
time to capitalize upon their unique position to mediate civil cases
effectively.174
2.

New Discovery Rules

A primary role that magistrates have played for some time is to
assist the district judges in presiding over pretrial matters in civil
cases, such as discovery plans and disputes.' 7 5 A magistrate "may
hear and determine any pretrial matter pending before the court" except certain designated (for the most part dispositive) motions.176 The
parties have the right to appeal any such preliminary rulings, but
they will be overturned by the district judge only upon a showing of
abuse of discretion or error of law.177 This role is the primary role
magistrates are playing in the processing of civil cases.
In 1988, magistrates disposed of 95,953 non-dispositive civil motions. 178 It is no secret why. Civil discovery has grown more and
more contentious, requiring more and more judicial time.179 This burden falls most heavily on the magistrates who under many districts'
170. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (a)(1),(4)(Supp. V 1993).
171. See 1980 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 2, at tbl. M-3.
172. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988). See also Cwrm JUSTICE REFORm AcT ADviSORY GRoup,
U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE N. DIST. OF ILL., PRELimiNARY REPORT 20 (1993)

(describing procedures under the Bail Reform Act).
173. See 1980 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 2, at tbl. M-4. See also 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(A)(Supp. V 1993)(magistrate may hear and determine any pretrial
matter in a criminal case other than motion to dismiss or quash an indictment or
information made by the defendant or to suppress evidence); 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B)(Supp. V 1993)(magistrate may hear and make recommendations
for such motions, subject to de novo review).
174. FnRA REPORT, supra note 22, at.80.
175. This is the magistrate's role as "Team Player." Seron, supra note 133, at 357.
176. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A)(Supp. V 1993).
177. Id.
178. 1992 ANNuAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 83, tbl. 16.
179. The literature on discovery abuse and the need for judicial supervision to control
it is immense. See, e.g., Brazil, supra note 30.
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local procedures have standing orders to handle discovery disputes.18 0
Pretrial supervision requires a significant amount of magistrates' time
and will continue to do so as long as lawyers are prepared to squabble
about discovery. By 1992, however, the number of civil non-dispositive motions handled by magistrates had fallen to 49,844, which was
fewer than had been handled in the previous ten years.1 8 1 Many hope
that recent procedural changes will accelerate this trend, and if they
are right, magistrates may have significant additional time to devote
to mediation of civil cases.
a. Mandatory Disclosure
The number and ferocity of discovery disputes have been
bemoaned for years.18 2 The dissatisfaction with the type of adversary
discovery that leads to this number of discovery disputes has resulted
in the adoption of an amendment to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure designed to foster cooperation and disclosure.S3
Under new Rule 26(a), litigants will have to disclose automatically the
names of witnesses, identities and locations of documents, computations of damages, and insurance agreements.18 4 The lawyers will be
obligated to meet and discuss their disclosures and to plan for what
additional discovery each will need.' 8 5 Later in the case, the parties
will have to exchange extensive material regarding their experts, 8 6
and court approval for expert depositions no longer will be necessary.18 7 All of these provisions are intended to make the pretrial process run more smoothly and with less judicial involvement.
Many people, including a majority of the United States House of
Representatives and three members of the Supreme Court of the
United States, do not believe that new Rule 26 will have the effect of
180. See Silberman, supra note 8, at 2140 (stating that magistrates have the highest

degree of participation in civil cases in discovery). See also Judge Wayne E.Alley:
The Growing Role of the Magistrate Judge, supra note 147 at 11 (describing the
"heavy component of discovery disputes" on magistrates' dockets).
181. 1992 ANmuAL REPORT, supra note 14, at 83, tbl. 16.
182. See, e.g., BROOKINGs INsT., supra note 161, at 6; Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Discovery

Abuse Revisited: Some Specific Proposalsto Amend the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,26 U.S.F. L. Rnv. 189 (1992); Jack H. Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme
Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,69
CAL. L. REv. 806 (1981); Michael E. Wolfson, Addressing the Adversarial Dilemma of Civil Discovery, 36 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 17 (1988).
183. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
184. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(1). The disclosure obligation is triggered with respect to any
disputed matter that is alleged "with particularity." Id.

185. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f).
186. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a)(2).
187. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
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reducing the number or the ferocity of discovery disputes.' 8 S Others,
prominently among them a number of federal judges and the Director
of the Federal Judicial Center (himself a Senior Judge), vociferously
disagree.' 8 9 The split has carried into the individual districts, many
of which have opted out of new Rule 26, at least temporarily.190 There
is even some indication that Congress may step in and "roll back" the
mandatory disclosure rule.191
This is not the place to attempt to resolve this debate. But if the
critics are wrong and the new rule does have a significant impact on
the number of discovery disputes that require judicial intervention,
the magistrates will have much more time to spend on their other duties. Their days will no longer be filled with motions to compel, motions for protective orders, and motions for sanctions. They may have
time for more productive endeavors. The admittedly time-consuming
task of mediating civil cases, to which magistrate judges can make a
useful and significant contribution, should be a prime candidate for
replacing the time previously devoted to discovery disputes that may
be avoided through mandatory disclosure.
b.

Depositions

Another potentially significant change is the amendment of Rule
30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The new rule prohibits
argumentative or suggestive objections in depositions and forbids instructions not to answer except in very limited situations.192 The new
188. SUPREME COURT OF THE UNIrED STATES, AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RuLNs OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE, H.R. Doc. No. 74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 104-10 (1993)(Scalia,

J., dissenting); Colleen McMahon & Jordana G. Schwartz, Analysis of Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil ProcedureAsApproved by the JudicialConference and Forwardedto the Supreme Court,in Am. Law Inst.-Am. Bar Ass'n, New
Directions in Civil Procedure 16-17 (1993); Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating
Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again Time for Reform?, 138 F.R.D.
155 (1991); Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 795 (1991).

189. William W Schwarzer, In Defense ofAutomatic Disclosurein Discovery, 27 GA. L.
REv. 655 (1993); William W Schwarzer, Slaying The Monsters of Cost and Delay:
Would DisclosureBe More Effective Than Discovery?, 74 JUDIcATURE 178 (Dec.Jan. 1991); William W Schwarzer, The FederalRules, the Adversary Process,and

Discovery Reform, 50 U. PrrT. L. REV. 703 (1989).
190. As of January 25, 1994,28 of the 94 districts had announced that they will operate under mandatory disclosure while 48 have opted out. 62 U.S.L.W. 2449 (Gen.
Jan. 25, 1994).
191. Bryan J. Holzberg,CongressAdjourns Without Blocking Discovery Reform, LrriG.
NEws (A.B.A. Sec. on Litig.), Feb. 1994, at 11 (quoting Washington lawyer Loren

Kieve saying- "Simply because Congress was unable to act in time shouldn't
mean that they won't kill the bills on mandatory disclosure.").
192. FED. . Crv. P. 30(d)(1) now states:
Any objection to evidence during a deposition shall be stated concisely
and in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner. A party may
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rule also permits the court to sanction the responsible parties if the
"court finds... an impediment, delay, or other conduct... has frustrated the fair examination of the deponent."'193 Disputes in depositions have been a major source of business for magistrates.' 9 4 If the
amendments to Rule 30 succeed in reducing the volume of that business, 19 5 then the magistrates will have that much more time to devote
to other duties such as mediation.
Another rule change that may affect the number of deposition disputes that the magistrates must hear is the new limitation on the
number of depositions to ten per party.196 Also, by local rule, the districts may now establish presumptive time limits on the duration of
depositions.1 97 If these rule changes result in fewer depositions being
taken, there will be fewer opportunities for even legitimate disputes to
arise.198 The magistrates will then have more time to mediate.
c.

Discovery Conferences

Motions to compel discovery and motions for protective orders may
no longer be filed without a certification from the lawyer filing the motion that he or she has attempted to resolve the discovery dispute
without court action.19 9 Numerous local rules have heretofore required such a conference, and the experience of those courts indicated
that it helped to resolve discovery disputes through informal
means. 2 0 0 Furthermore, any claims of privilege now must be accominstruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a
privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence directed by the court, or to
present a motion [to terminate or limit the examination].

Id.
At least one district had previously forbidden similar conduct. U.S. DIST.
COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF N.Y., STANDING ORDERS OF THE COURT ON EFFEcmrv
DIsCOvERY IN CIVL CASES, reprinted in OWEN Fiss ET AL., PROCEDURE 932-38

(1988).
193. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2).
194. Interview with Magistrate Judge Charles Wilson of the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Florida, in Tampa, Fla. (Jan. 13, 1994).
195. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30 advisory committee's notes.
196. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A).
197. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(2).

198. It is, of course, possible that these particular changes will result in significant
increases in the number of discovery disputes that the magistrates must handle.
Both the number and the duration of depositions are subject to being changed by
order of the court to serve the particular needs of the case. FED. R. Crv. P.
30(a)(2)(A)(more than 10 depositions may be taken with leave of court), and 30
(d)(2)(the court shall allow more than the allotted time if "needed for the fair
examination of the deponent" or if the other party has obstructed the deposition).
By making limitations presumptive rather than absolute, the drafters of the rule

promoted the ability of the court to tailor discovery to the individual case but at
the cost possibly of encouraging more skirmishing in front of the magistrate.
199. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c), 37(a)(2)(A)-(B), 37(d).
200. FED. R. CIv. P. 37 advisory committee's notes.
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panied by a list of the privileged material in addition to the grounds
for the alleged privilege. 2 0 The hope is that such a list will forestall
the motion to compel by showing that the privileges exist or at least
become a basis for resolution of the dispute without judicial involvement. rlf these changes are effective, this will free the magistrate to
seize the opportunity to spend more time settling civil cases.
3. ProcessingPrisonerCases
Magistrates spend a significant amount of time handling routine
civil cases such as prisoner petitions.20 2 Carroll Seron's study of magistrate activity characterized this as the "specialist" role.203 Whereas

changes with respect to discovery may free the magistrates to spend
more time in mediation, the trend with respect to prisoner cases
threatens to do the opposite.2 0 4
The numbers and the trend with respect to prisoner petitions are
striking. The number of such matters handled by magistrates increased by forty-six percent from 1982 to 1992.205 Further, they rose
by ten percent alone in fiscal year 1993. The number of prisoner petitions is growing dramatically and may well continue to do so, due in
large part to the fact that the prison population in this country has
grown so dramatically in the past eight years. The number of inmates
in the United States has more than doubled since 1980 and now
stands at more than one million.206 Magistrates, who are statutorily

authorized to hear not only applications for posttrial relief by prisoners but also petitions challenging the conditions of confinement, must
be particularly concerned that forty-three jurisdictions have prison
systems that are under court orders to reduce overcrowding.207 Petitions from prisoners represent the fastest growing part of the magistrate's workload. Unless changes occur, magistrates may expect to be
201. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26(b)(5).
202. Smith, Lobbying and Reform, supra note 130, at 166 n.18. The statutory authority for this role is 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B)(Supp. V 1993).
203. Seron, supra note 133, at 356-57.
204. See, e.g., Tracey I. Levy, Comment, Mandatory Disclosure: A Methodology for
Reducing The Burden of Pro Se Prisoner Litigation, 57 ALB. L. REV. 487, 503
(1993)(describing upsurge in prisoner cases). See also Silberman, supranote 8, at
2140 (noting increase in prisoner cases).
205. 1992 ANmuAI REPoar, supra note 14, at 83, tbl. 16; StatisticsReveal Active Year
ForJudiciary,THm TimD BRANCH (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.) Feb.
1994, at 5.
206. Sayler, supra note 4, at 1. Mr. Sayler, the Chair of the Section of Litigation of the
American Bar Association, also notes that from 1985 to 1990, the states doubled
their spending on prisons, to $13 billion, while the Federal Bureau of Prisons has
doubled in size since 1986. Id.
207. Id.
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handling increasing numbers of such petitions. 20 8 All the status, ability, and experience in the world will not help magistrates mediate
cases to successful conclusions if they do not have time to do so.
There are, however, attempts being made to curtail the number of
prisoner petitions. The Violent Crime Control and Law EnfOircement
Act of 1994 requires exhaustion of state administrative remedies
before petitions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 can be brought.20 9 Such efforts are consistent with one federal judge's view that one percent of
prisoner cases have validity and that the others "are just recreation
for people with time on their hands."210 The reform of section 1983
would affect two-thirds of the magistrates' prisoner dockets.211 Another type of reform would require prisoners to pay some
or all of the
standard filing fees in connection with their cases.21 2
The other one-third of the prisoner docket consists of habeas
corpus petitions. Every recent Congress has seen failed proposals to
reform habeas corpus. 21 3 Once again, both the House and Senate
have deleted all provisions relating to habeas reform from the most
recent anti-crime legislation. 21 4 In so doing, Congress has left untouched a fast-growing source of business for magistrates, one that
may impair their ability to make a more significant contribution to
settlement of civil cases.
Thus, the news on prisoner litigation is mixed. The number of
prisoner petitions bears careful watching lest it overwhelm the magistrates and prevent them from playing the significant role in settlement of civil cases that their experience and status are only now
permitting them to play.
208. Schwarzer & Wheeler, supra note 4, at 680. See also Smith, Lobbying and Reform, supra note 130, at 195-96.
209. Conference Report 103-711 § 20416, 55 Crim. Law Rep. (BNA) 2319 (1994). See
also Crime Bill Moves Through House, THnw BRANCH (Admin. Off. of the U.S.
Cts., Wash., D.C.), May 1994, at 3.
210. Jeffrey N. Cole & Robert E. Shapiro, Interview with Judge HubertL. Will, LITIG.

(A.B.A. Sec. on Litig.), Fall 1993, at 26, 27. See also CongressDebatesAnti-Crime
Legislation,THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.) Nov. 1993,

211.
212.
213.

214.

at 8 (quoting Senator Grassley: "Prisoner civil rights cases are overloading and
clogging our federal courts.... These cases average $50,000 each in costs to tax
payers [sic]. A very small percentage of the population is clogging the courts with
14 percent of the cases.").
Federal Courts Improvement Act Transmitted to Congress, THID BRANCH (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.) Dec. 1993, at 9.
Levy, supra note 204, at 511-13.
See Crime Bill FaltersAgain In Senate, THD BRANCH (Admin. Off. of the U.S.
Cts., Wash., D.C.) Apr. 1992, at 7; Senate Debates Anti-Crime Package, Tmn
BRANCH (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.) June 1990, at 4; Debt Collection, Habeas Corpus, ProductLiability Measures on Agenda ForCongress'Second
Session, THnD BRANCH (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Wash., D.C.) Feb. 1988, at 4.
Crime Bill Moves Through House, THD BRANCH (Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts.,
Wash., D.C.) May 1994, at 1, 2.
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CONCLUSION

Magistrates are in a unique position to assist in settlement of civil
cases. In large part, this position is the result of recent trends in federal cWil litigation, some of which are desirable and others of which
are regrettable. Magistrates are enjoying new status and are exercising their trial authority with increasing frequency. Both trends assist
the magistrate in making settlement discussions more realistic, more
satisfying, and more productive. Some of the attractiveness of magistrate mediation, however, arises from more negative developments.
The inability of lawyers to form realistic trial expectations requires
the intervention of experienced lawyers or judges. The habitual incivility of lawyers toward each other requires the presence of a judicial
officer to keep counsel in line. Magistrates can perform both roles.
None of these trends, good or bad, shows any sign of abating soon.
Ultimately, the success or failure of magistrate mediation may depend
upon whether the other duties of magistrates permit them to spend
sufficient time in mediations. If they do, their unique position in the
federal judicial system will serve the process of settlement well.

